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In one of the most influential law review articles ever written about contract
law, Lon Fuller and William Perdue identified three interests that remedies for
breach of contract protect: the “expectation interest,” the “reliance interest,” and
the “restitution interest.”1 The normal remedy protects the “expectation interest.”
In the words of the Second Restatement of Contracts, it is a party’s “interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract been performed.”2
The thesis of this Article is that the goal of contract law should not be to
protect a party’s “expectation interest.” Remedies for breach of contract often
happen to put the non-breaching party in as good a position as he would have
been in if the contract had been performed. But sometimes they do not or should
not. Moreover, even when they do, the reason for giving a remedy is not to put a
party where he would been absent a breach.
I. WHY PROTECT THE EXPECTATION INTEREST?
The original contribution of Fuller and Perdue was not to identify the
expectation, reliance, and restitution interests but to list them as the three possible
interests the law might protect and to ask why they should be protected.
Williston, in language they quoted, had defined what they called the expectation
interest in these words: “In fixing the amount of these damages, the general
purpose of the law is, and should be, to give compensation: – that is, to put the
plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the defendant kept
his contract.”3 German law, as Fuller knew, drew a similar distinction between a
party’s positive Vertragsinteresse—a damage award that would put him where he
would have been if the contract had been fulfilled—and his negative
Vertragsinteresse which would compensate for harm he had suffered because the
promise had been made and then broken.4 He would also have been familiar with
the role of restitutionary remedies in German law in unwinding an invalid
contract.
One justification that Fuller and Perdue gave for protecting the expectation
interest was new: to do so is an indirect way of protecting a party’s reliance on a
contract. Another justification they described and rejected was old: it “may be
found in the much-discussed ‘will theory’ of contract law.” This, indeed, had
been the original justification for protecting the expectation interest.

1.
(1936).
2.
3.
at 52).
4.
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L.L. Fuller & William Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE. L.J. 52, 54
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1338 (1920), (citing Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1,
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 55 n. 4, 86, 86 n. 54.
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A. The Original Justification
As Fuller and Perdue explained:
[The will] theory views the contracting parties as exercising, so to speak, a
legislative power, so that the legal enforcement of a contract becomes merely an
implementing by the state of a kind of private law already established by the
parties. If A has made, in proper form, a promise to pay B one thousand dollars,
we compel A to pay this sum simply because the rule or lex set up by the parties
calls for this payment.5
They cited one of the foremost will theorists, the great 19th century German
jurist Bernhard Windscheid: “A legal transaction is the exercise of the creative
power which the private will possesses in legal matters. The individual
commands, and the law adopts his command as its own.”6
In common law and civil law jurisdictions, the 19th century was an age of
will theories and of conceptualism. The German jurists were masters of both.
Conceptualism was a method of legal reasoning that began with the definitions of
basic legal terms and then tried to extract as many legal conclusions from these
definitions as possible. Contract was defined to require a “manifestation of will
(Willenserklärung) directed to bringing about a legal result.” 7 The law brings
about the result that the individual willed. It followed by definition that the
appropriate remedy was to compel the breaching party to perform what he
promised or to award damages in the amount of the non-breaching party’s
positive Vertragsinteresse: damages that would put him in as good a position as
he would have been in if the contract had been performed.
The German jurists claimed that their theory could explain the Roman legal
texts that had been in force in Germany and in much of continental Europe for
centuries. In Roman law, the plaintiff could recover his interesse, and according
to one text, his interesse (quod interest) could be harm (damnum) he suffered, or
the gain (lucrum) he might have made.8 Since the Middle Ages, these forms of
loss had been called damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. If, in principle, the
non-breaching party should recover both damnum emergens and lucrum cessans,
then, it would seem he should be put in as good a position as he would have been
in absent a breach. Indeed, the Latin word interesse seemed to combine two
words, inter, meaning “between,” and esse, meaning “to be.” Thus, it would
seem, the plaintiff should recover the difference between where he was after the
breach and where he would have been if the contract had been performed. The
19th century jurists were vastly simplifying the difficult texts that governed when

5. Id. at 58.
6. 1 BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS § 68 (9th ed. 1906) (quoting id.).
7. 1 BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS § 69 (9th ed. 1906); see 3 FRIEDRICH
CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS § 134 (Berlin, 1840); GEORG FRIEDRICH
PUCHTA, PANDEKTEN §§ 49, 54 (Leipzig, 1844).
8. CODE JUST. 7.47.2.
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a non-breaching party could recover for harm he suffered or profits he would
have made.9 Later scholars pointed out that interesse to the Romans meant what
“interest” does to us: the plaintiff was to get “what he was interested in, what
concerned him, what was of consequence to him.”10
German critics such as Rudolf von Ihering attacked conceptualism itself
because it ignored purposes the law sought to achieve. Moreover, the reasoning
was hollow. The conclusions which the conceptualists ceremoniously unpacked
from their definitions either did not follow from them or did so only because they
had been packed into the definitions in advance. Fuller and Perdue wrote after the
revolt against conceptualism had taken a firm hold in the United States. They
began their article by noting: “The proposition that legal rules can be understood
only with reference to the purposes they serve would today scarcely be regarded
as an exciting truth. The notion that law exists as a means to an end has been
commonplace for at least half a century.”11
They claimed that the protection of a party’s “expectation interest” was not a
logical consequence of the will theory of contract:
[T]he will theory . . . cannot be regarded as dictating in all cases a
recovery of the expectancy. If a contract represents a kind of private law,
it is a law which usually says nothing at all about what shall be done
when it is violated. A contract is in this respect like an imperfect statute
which provides no penalties, and which leaves it to the courts to find a
way to effectuate its purposes. There would, therefore, be no necessary
contradiction between the will theory and a rule which limited damages
to the reliance interest. Under such a rule the penalty for violating the
norm established by the contract would simply consist in being
compelled to compensate the other party for detrimental reliance.12
True enough. But Fuller and Perdue did not seem to realize that the idea the
law should protect an “expectation interest” was based on a flawed interpretation
of Roman law by jurists committed to conceptualism and to a will theory of
contract. Instead of suggesting we jettison the idea, they assumed that the law
does (or should) protect such an interest, and then, unsuccessfully, asked why.

9. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN
TRADITION 826–27 (1990).
10. Id. at 826.
11. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 52.
12. Id. at 58.
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B. Modern Justifications
1. Fuller and Perdue: protecting the reliance interest.
Fuller and Perdue began their article by saying that “legal rules can be
understood only with reference to the purposes they serve . . . .” Yet, they
acknowledged, “[i]t is . . . no easy thing” to explain why the law protects the
“expectation interest. “In this case we ‘compensate’ the plaintiff by giving him
something he never had. This seems on the face of things a queer kind of
‘compensation.’”13
The law does so, they suggested, as an indirect way of protecting a party’s
reliance on a contract. Some losses due to reliance are hard to prove, for example
“the gains prevented’ by reliance, that is, losses, involved in foregoing the
opportunity to enter other contracts.” 14 Putting the plaintiff where he would have
been if the contract had been performed “is a cure . . . in the sense that [it] offers
the measure of recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff for the (often very
numerous and very difficult to prove) individual acts and forbearances which
make up this total reliance on the contract.”15
Why, then, should reliance be protected? According to Fuller and Perdue:
[T]here is . . . a policy in favor of promoting and facilitating reliance on
business agreements. . . . When business agreements are not only made
but are also acted on, the division of labor is facilitated, goods find their
way to the places where they are most needed, and economic activity is
generally stimulated.16
Here, they anticipated one feature of the contemporary law and economics
movement. The answer to why the law does something cannot be that it is fair or
just to do so. The answer is that is good economic policy.
Be that as it may, if their account is correct, then, in principle, contract law
collapses into tort. Indeed, Grant Gilmore claimed that “The Death of Contract”
was due to the recognition of liability for promissory reliance. That doctrine,
adopted by § 90 of the First and Second Restatements of Contracts, allows the
plaintiff to recover when he changed his position to his detriment by relying on a
promise. As in tort, the defendant is liable for fault, or at least for conduct he
knew or should have known could harm the plaintiff. Some scholars have
suggested that the plaintiff should recover only for the amount that he was hurt—
the amount that Fuller and Perdue called his “reliance damages” as opposed to

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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this “expectation damages.”17 Some have suggested that the protection of reliance
is based on tort principles. 18 If so, and Fuller and Perdue are right that the
expectation interest is protected only as a way of protecting the reliance interest,
then contract law is ultimately based on tort principles.
That claim, however, is deeply circular. According to Fuller and Perdue, the
losses due to reliance include “the gains prevented’ by reliance, that is, losses,
involved in foregoing the opportunity to enter other contracts.” 19 Suppose a party
insures his house against fire for $500,000 and sues to collect that amount when
his house burns down. If his recovery is based on reliance, then the reason he
recovers is that he relied by giving up the opportunity to enter into a different
insurance contract with a second insurance company on the same terms. But the
reason he could have recovered from the second company, by the same logic, is
that by contracting with it, he gave up the chance of entering into a contract on
the same terms with a third. And so forth. The earth rests on a turtle, which rests
on another turtle, which rests on another, and it is turtles all the way down.
Moreover, Fuller and Perdue’s account ignores the obvious reason that the
party to such a contract ought to recover. The insurance company assumed the
risk that the insured’s house would burn down, and it was compensated for
assuming that risk. Even if there were only one company selling fire insurance in
the area in which the plaintiff lived, that company should pay. So should anyone
who is compensated for assuming a risk if that risk materializes. The goal of a
contract, as we will see, should not be to protect the expectation interest. It
should be to hold a party responsible for the risks he was paid to assume. The
reason is that it is fair.
2. Law and economics: achieving an efficient result.
A more recent explanation of why the law protects the “expectation interest”
is that it is efficient to do so. An efficient transaction leaves both parties better off
without making anyone else worse off. Each party wants what he is to receive
more than what he wants to give up. As Robert Cooter and Melvin Eisenberg
explained: “The difference between the value that a party places upon what he
expects to receive and give up is called surplus. The lost-surplus formula awards
the victim of breach the surplus that he would have enjoyed if the breaching party

17. Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents 50 MICH. L. REV. 639, 873
(1952); see Warren A. Seavy, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913
(1951).
18. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 117 (2018) [hereinafter
EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES]. Other scholars have taken the opposite position, that the doctrine
concerns the enforcement of a promise, not compensation for harm suffered by relying on it. Randy E. Barnett,
The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 528 (1996); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis
of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 113 (1991).
19. Fuller & Purdue, supra note 1, at 60.
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had performed.”20
It is efficient to do so, according to Cooter and Eisenberg, because:
If the promisor does not perform, the promisee loses his share of the
value of the contract. If the promisor is liable for that loss, he internalizes
not only his own loss but the losses to the promisee that result from his
failure to perform. In contrast, if the promisor is liable only for reliance
damages, he will not internalize the full value of performance to the
promisee. Thus expectation damages create efficient incentives for the
promisor’s performance . . . .21
According to Cooter and Eisenberg, for these reasons, the parties themselves
would choose a remedy that would require a party in breach to pay expectation
damages. Would they? If the promisor breached, he would be liable for the full
value of the performance to the promisee. Suppose he were contracting for the
same goods and services with two promisees. To one, the performance was of
vastly more value than to the other. If his potential liability to the first promisee
is vastly greater than his liability to the second, he will charge the first a great
deal more than the second for assuming such a risk. The amount he would charge
might be so high that the first promisee would rather run the risk himself than
pay so much.
If we ask, as Cooter and Eisenberg do, what remedy the parties themselves
would choose, the answer is not a remedy that will protect their expectation
interests. It is a remedy that will hold each of them responsible for the risks he
assumed. That, as we will see, should be the goal of the law of contracts. The
reason is not only that it is the remedy the parties would choose. The reason is
that it is fair.
C. An Alternative Approach
In another article, Hao Jiang and I maintained that a contract of exchange
should be enforceable when it is economically fair and voluntary.22 It is
economically fair when a party is compensated for the risks he assumes. It is
voluntary so long as a party puts a higher value on what he is to receive than on
what he is to give. The remedies for breach of contract can be explained by the
same two principles: that each party be held responsible for the risks that he has
been compensated to assume, and a party should not be held to an agreement to

20. Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1434,
1439 (1985).
21. Id. at 1463. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 283 (6th ed. 2016);
EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 183–84.
22. James Gordley & Hao Jiang, Contract as Voluntary Commutative Justice, 2019 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–
6.

83

2020 / The Myth of “Expectation Interest”
which he never consented.
Eisenberg mentions both concerns when he explains why protecting a party’s
expectation interest is not only efficient but “fair.” According to Eisenberg,
“allowing a promisor to limit damages to less than the promisee’s expectation
would . . . have the same unfair quality as allowing a promisor to renege on a fair
bet that he made and lost.”23 It would be better to say that for a party to escape
responsibility for a risk he was paid to assume, it is economically unfair for
precisely that reason. According to Eisenberg, “[i]f A has rendered a bargainedfor performance to B, we know that A was willing to render that performance to
B for the agreed-upon price. We cannot know whether A would have rendered
that performance to B for any lesser price.” 24 That is the consideration we refer to
as voluntariness.
Eisenberg is correct that both considerations should matter. The reason is
that, as Eisenberg said, a party should neither be allowed to renege on a fair bet
that he made and lost or held to a bargain to which he would never have agreed.
At stake is not economic policy but justice.
We believe that contract remedies can be explained by these two concerns:
economic fairness and voluntariness. We will discuss them in turn.
II. ECONOMIC FAIRNESS
A. The Principle: Liability for Risks Assumed
1. The allocation of risks.
In our earlier article, Jiang and I argued that a contract is economically fair
when each part is compensated for the risks that he assumed. A corollary is that a
party should be held responsible for the risk that he assumed and was
compensated to bear.
In some cases, the risks that each party assumed are assigned by the terms of
the contract itself. The contract provides that one performance is to be exchanged
for another. Knowing that much, one can tell how certain risks have been
allocated.
When the parties contract at an agreed price, each gives up the chance of
entering into a more favorable bargain. Each does so to avoid the risk that he will
have to enter into one that is less favorable. If the contract is for the sale of a
fungible commodity with a market price, the seller is giving up his chance to sell
for more if the market price rises to avoid having to sell for less if it falls. The
buyer is giving up his chance to buy for less if it falls to avoid the risk of having
23. Shawn J. Bayern & Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure and its Discontents, 2013 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1, 3; see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient
Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 980 (2005).
24. See Bayern & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 5.
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to buy for more if it rises.
If the parties contract for a unique item, such as a house, the seller gives up
the chance that if he had waited longer, he could have received a higher price.
The buyer gives up the chance that if he had looked further, he could have paid
the same price for as satisfactory a house or a lower price for a more satisfactory
one. Each party contracts to avoid the risk that otherwise he will have to accept a
less favorable bargain
When the parties contract at a fixed price for a performance that is yet to be
made, one party takes the risk that the performance will cost more than he
estimates, and the other that it will cost less. Specific performance requires the
breaching party to assume these risks. So does a damage award that holds him
responsible for the risks allocated by the terms of the contract.
Because these risks are allocated by the terms of the contract itself, one can
tell which party has assumed them without speculating about the parties’
intentions. If they contract at a certain price, for example, each one takes the risk
of losing out on a better deal. Eisenberg has said the reason parties contract in
advance for what he calls “off-the-shelf” goods or services, “would seldom be to
allocate the risk of price changes or to speculate on prices: consumers normally
do not make contracts to purchase off-the-shelf services for either purpose.”25 An
example is a yoga studio that signs up a would-be student for a year-long class
that is limited to 20 and will be cancelled if fewer than twelve students enroll.
The student agrees to pay a fee of $800. Her reason for doing so most likely is
“to ensure a place in the class.”26 Another example is a dealer that sells a new
Camry for future delivery for $30,000. Eisenberg argued—correctly, as we will
see later on—that the student should not be liable if she changes her mind after
sixteen students have signed up. Neither should the car buyer. Nevertheless, it
would be economically unfair if the studio refused to give her lessons unless she
paid $900, or the dealer refused to deliver the car unless the buyer paid $35,000.
In setting the price, the studio and the dealer gave up the chance of charging a
higher price to attract more customers. It would also be economically unfair for
the student or the car buyer to repudiate the contract because they found they
could get cheaper lessons or a cheaper car elsewhere. They would be acting like
someone who accepted a job on a five-year contract and then tried to escape
when someone offered him more.
It may happen, of course, that the price in the contract is not meant to bind
the parties. In the case of the five-year employment contract, there might be an
understanding that if the employee’s services were of exceptional value, the
employer would raise his salary; and in doing so, the employer would take into
account other offers the employee has received. But then, whatever the contract
says, we are no longer speaking of a commitment to exchange at a price agreed in
advance. But there ought to be clear evidence that the contract does not mean
25. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 218.
26. Id.
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what it says.
Other risks are not allocated by the terms of the contract. The breaching party
may or may not have assumed these risks. An example is the loss the nonbreaching party suffers because the breach prevented him from entering into
favorable transactions with others. We have to ask how the parties would have
allocated these risks. The answer depends on which party can bear them at the
lowest cost.
Which party is best able to bear a risk, economists tell us, depends on three
factors. One factor is who can best foresee the magnitude of the risk. A risk is
lower for the party who can best foresee it for roughly the same reason that the
risk of playing poker is lower for someone who can peek at the other players’
cards. Another factor is who can best control the risk. If the party who can do so
must bear the cost if the risk eventuates, then the further risk is eliminated that he
may omit the precautions he ought to take to control it. A third factor is who can
best spread the risk over similar transactions, whether by buying insurance or
self-insuring. The risk of a house catching fire is less for an insurance company
than for a homeowner because it can spread that risk over the many houses it
insures. The risk of a streak of bad luck is less for a casino than an individual
gambler.27
The party in breach is often in the best position to foresee and control the risk
that he will breach. He is in the best position to spread that risk among similar
transactions, provided that the risk is much the same for any of his customers or
clients. If the adverse consequences differ from one customer or client to the
next, the breaching party will be compensated for bearing it only if he charges a
higher price to those customers for whom the adverse consequences are likely to
be abnormally large. He will not have been compensated if he charges all his
customers or clients the same price even though, for some of them, the adverse
consequences of a breach are likely to be much higher than for others. As a
general rule, he should not be liable to a party who suffers an abnormally large
amount for harm unless that party paid an extra amount for him to assume the
extra risk. Of course, that is only a general rule, and the parties, who know best
what risks they can bear, can provide otherwise.
The reason parties would place the risk on whoever can bear it most cheaply
is that, as economists tell us, the parties will normally be risk averse. Of course,
business firms often enter into transactions that involve enormous risks; but when
economists describe them as “risk averse,” they are using that phrase in a
technical sense. A risk averse person will not bet $100 that a coin will come up
heads unless he will win more than $100 if it comes up tails. He will not run risks
like those that gamblers run in a casino. The gamblers run a risk like those who
bet on a coin flip, a risk that exists only because of the rules of the game they
27. On the first and last of these factors, see Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977). On the second,
see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
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play. Risk averse parties will not gamble, but they will allocate between them the
risks that one party or the other must bear. They will do so by placing them on
the party who can bear them at the lowest cost. 28
Some risks, then, are assigned by the terms of the contract itself. The party
who assumed them should be held liable for damages. When they are not, they
should fall on the party who can bear these risks at the lowest cost. In general,
that will be the party in breach, unless the non-breaching party will suffer an
abnormally large amount for harm and has not paid an extra amount to the other
party for assuming the extra risk.
When a risk has been assigned by the terms of the contract itself, we will
refer to the damages as “direct.” When it has not, we will refer to the damages as
“consequential.” In drawing this distinction, we are reviving, refining, and
explaining an old one that has almost disappeared.
2. Direct and consequential damages.
As we will see, some courts still distinguish between damages that are
“direct,” “general,” or “natural,” and those that are “consequential” or “special.”
As Victor Goldberg has noted, that distinction has fallen into disuse: “A Westlaw
search for [‘consequential damages’ and synonymous and ‘special damages’]
yielded 35 cases, and a similar search [for ‘general damages’ and synonymous
and ‘direct’ damages’] yielded 40.”29
As he noted, “[t]he Restatement (Second) is unhelpful.”30 It discusses the
distinction only as a misleading way of expressing the requirement that damages
must be foreseeable when the contract was made, a requirement we will discuss
later. According to the Restatement, courts have called a loss “natural” or that
damage “general” when “it results from a breach in the ordinary course of
events” and therefore is foreseeable. “The damages that are recoverable for loss
that results other than in the ordinary course of events are sometimes called
‘special’ or ‘consequential’ damages.” 31 According to the Restatement, “these
terms are often misleading,” which is to say, courts sometimes use them in a
different sense, and one that the Restatement does not like. They concluded that
“it is not necessary to distinguish between ‘general’ and ‘special’ or
‘consequential’ damages for the purpose of the rule . . . .”32
The common law courts that drew this distinction borrowed it from civil law
which had distinguished between damages that are circa rem and those that are
extra rem. A party’s damages were circa rem if they were simply due to the loss

28. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (7th ed. 2007).
29. GOLDBERG RETHINKING THE LAW OF CONTRACT DAMAGES 171–72 (2019) [hereinafter GOLDBERG,
RETHINKING DAMAGES].
30. Id. at 172.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
32. Id.
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of the performance he had contracted for. If he suffered further damages because
of the breach, they were extra rem. As Reinhard Zimmermann observed, this
distinction “dominated the discussion for centuries.” 33 By the 18th century, he
noted, it “became imprecise and was muddled up with other criteria.” 34 It was
eclipsed in the 19th century with the rise of the will theories and the principle
that contract remedies should protect the expectation interest. Defined with more
precision, however, it is a better alternative for determining what damages to
award.
The distinction goes back to medieval jurists’ interpretation of the Roman
legal texts that were then in force in much of continental Europe. One Roman
text said that a seller of wine who fails to deliver it on time is liable for the
highest price the wine would command.35 The reason, according to the text, is
that “when the seller is liable for non-delivery of an object, every benefit to the
buyer is taken into account that concerns the thing itself” (circa rem ipsam
consistit).36 Citing this text, medieval jurists taught that whether damages were
recoverable depended in part on whether damages were circa rem or extra rem.
Accursius (c. 1182–1263), one of the most influential medieval jurists, said
that for non-performance, damages can be recovered when they are circa rem but
not when they are extra rem.37 One of the greatest medieval jurists, Bartolus of
Sassoferrato (1313–1357), refined this distinction. Damages are circa rem, or
“intrinsic,” when they concern “that which pertains to the thing [the
performance] itself, or its value, and that which is immediately from it, such as
fruits and offspring. But that which arises circumstantially (occasione rei) and
not ex re ipsa should be called extrinsic.”38 As noted earlier, according to the
medieval jurists, as damages, a party might recover for damnum emergens (i.e.,
the harm he suffered) or for lucrum cessans (i.e., the gain he might have made).
According to Bartolus, when one party to a contract fails to perform, the other
party can recover for harm suffered and lost gain provided that are circa rem.
The harm he suffers circa rem is not receiving the other party’s performance. The
gain he might have made circa rem is the difference between the contract price of
a performance and its common value, or, as we would say, its market price. For
example, “a basket of grain was worth 10 and five months later worth 20.” The
lucrum cessans is ten. Damages lucrum cessans that are extra rem can be
recovered only in special cases. One is when any party who entered into the
contract would have made the same gain if the contract had not been breached. 39
33. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 9, at 831.
34. Id. at 832.
35. DIG. 19.21.3.3.
36. Id.
37. ACCURSIUS, GLOSSA ORDINARIA to CODE JUST. 7.47.2 to dupli (Venice, 1581).
38. BARTOLUS DE SAXOFERRATO, COMMENTARIA CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS to CODE JUST. 7.47.2 (Venice,
1615).
39. He took this distinction from Petrus de Bellapertica who, however, used it to define when damages
were intrinsic rather than extrinsic. REPETITIO IN L. SI RES VENDITA § CUM PER VENDITOREM. ms. Vaticano
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It is a gain, as Bartolus put it, that “follows the object regardless of to whom it
goes” (sequitur rem penes quaecumque vadat).40
These rules are similar to those we propose. Similar, though not the same.
But they more accurately state what a remedy should do rather than the principle
that it should make the non-breaching party as well off as he would have been
had the contract been performed.
B. Three Applications
1. Liability for the difference between the contract price and value at the
time of breach.
When the parties enter into a contract at an agreed price, each of them gives
up his chance to contract at a price that is more favorable to avoid the chance of
having to accept a less favorable price. Consequently, the typical remedy is, and
should be, to allow the non-breaching party to obtain the price he locked in when
he contracted rather than a less favorable one he sought to avoid. Specific
performance allows a party to receive the performance that he was promised at
the contract price. Damages should award the difference between the less
advantageous price now available to the non-breaching party and the contract
price. The formulas are well known. In a contract to buy or sell goods, the buyer
receives the difference between the higher market price and the contract price.
The seller receives the difference between the contract price and the lower
market or resale price.
These remedies happen to protect what Fuller and Purdue called the
plaintiff’s “expectation interest.” But doing so is not the purpose of giving a
remedy. The purpose is to hold each party responsible for the risks he was
compensated to assume. Sometimes, that purpose is achieved by a party in as
good a position as he would have been had the contract been performed. But
sometimes it is not.
We will examine four situations in which it is not.
a. The lost volume seller.
The non-breaching party may be worse off because of the breach, not
because he was forced to accept a less favorable price, but because he lost an
Borghese 277 fol. 76 vb - fol. 77 ra, quoted in RAFFAELE VOLANTE ID QUOD INTEREST IL RISARCIMENTO IN
EQUIVALENTE NEL DIRITTO COMMUNE 99 (2012). As Volante noted, Petrus had replaced the distinction
between damages circa rem and extra rem with this distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic damages.
40. Id. He cited Roman texts which dealt with the sale of slaves who would have brought money with
them to whoever became their owner. DIG. 21.2.8; DIG. 9.2.23. The other case was one in which the profits
were derived from the ownership of the thing rather than from “reselling it or some other human activity” for,
with some things, “the nature of the thing plays a greater part” in producing a profit than human industry, as in
the profit from a farm (ex fundo).
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extra sale. Orthodox doctrine allows him to recover the extra amount he would
have made on the sale had the buyer not breached the contract. That would be the
proper result if protecting the “expectation interest” were the purpose of giving a
remedy. By our approach, it is not. The lost volume seller should not recover
since he was not deprived of his guarantee that he would not have to sell at a less
favorable price.
Section 2-708(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code allows recovery of “the
profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from
full performance by the buyer . . . .” An example is Neri v. Retail Marine Corp.41
The defendant contracted to buy a new boat of a specified model from the
defendant, a dealer. Six days later, the defendant notified the plaintiff that he
wished to rescind the contract because he was about to undergo hospitalization
and surgery. Four months later, the boat ordered for the defendant and received
by the plaintiff was sold to another buyer for the price that the defendant had
agreed to pay. The defendant was held liable for the contract price minus the
costs that the plaintiff saved because he did not have to purchase another boat.
Thus, plaintiff was made no worse off than he would have been if the contract
with the first customer had been performed.
The parties’ contract at a certain price are protected against the risk of having
to accept a less favorable price. In Neri, the seller did not receive a less favorable
price. If the contract is enforced, he will be protected against a different risk: the
risk that the buyer does not pay for merchandise he does not want. That risk is
not one the seller would pay the buyer to assume if both parties are risk averse. It
is like the risk that gamblers create when they bet on a coin flip. If neither party
were bound by the terms of the wager, neither would be harmed. Risk averse
parties will not enter into a contract that creates a risk of harm that exists only if
the contract is binding.
Suppose there were two competing boat dealers located next door to each
other, and a would-be buyer went first to one, then to the other, and then back
again, seeking the most favorable terms. He asked each dealer how much extra
he would have to pay for the privilege of backing out, and thereby costing the
dealer an extra sale. The pressure of competition would lead each dealer to give
him that privilege at no extra charge. Each dealer would realize that if the buyer
did not back out, it would sell an extra boat. If the buyer did back out, the dealer
would lose nothing.
Victor Goldberg began his discussion of the lost volume seller by quoting
White and Summers: a remedy for lost profits is “the recovery which all rightminded people would agree that the lost volume seller should have.”42 According
to Goldberg, “all those right-minded people are wrong . . . By cancelling the
order, the buyer in effect invokes an implied termination clause. The remedy
41. 285 N.E.2d 311, 313–14 (N.Y. 1972).
42. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 381 (6th ed. 2010), quoted
in GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 47.
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would be the price that the buyer would need to pay for termination
(cancellation).”43 Goldberg is correct, but we would take this argument a step
further. As we have shown, unless the seller may suffer some harm other than the
loss of an additional sale, the price he would need to pay for such a clause,
assuming competition among sellers, is zero.
Eisenberg maintained that the lost volume seller should recover his profits
because it is a consequence of the “expectation principle.”44 Yet he would not
allow the seller to recover when the buyer backs out of a contract for “off-theshelf” goods and services. His arguments concerning sellers of “off-the-shelf”
goods apply equally well to lost-volume sellers.
Earlier, we described the two hypothetical cases he used to illustrate his
point. Suppose a dealer sells a new Camry for future delivery. Or suppose a yoga
studio signs up a would-be student for a class that is undersubscribed. In such
cases, Eisenberg observes:
[I]t is unlikely that a consumer would knowingly enter into a . . . contract
in which she would be required to pay the entire contract price if she
cancelled, because damages measured that way would be highly
disproportionate to both the benefit to the consumer from making the
contract now rather than waiting . . . and the cost to the provider of
resulting from a breach by the consumer.45
According to Eisenberg, the reason that the consumer did not benefit by
contracting in advance is because “the reason [for doing so] would seldom be to
allocate the risk of price changes.” 46 We noted earlier the contract should
guarantee the consumer that the studio or dealer would not raise its price. But
why should it matter whether or not the parties wanted to allocate the risk of
price changes as long as the price never changed? In Eisenberg’s examples,
moreover, the cost to the provider is zero in the case of the yoga studio. It is zero
in the case of the car dealer, presumably because the dealer will not incur any
extra cost buying the Camry for his customer. The dealer will not incur any extra
cost if the customer cancels before he orders the Camry or if he sells the Camry
to someone else. The same can be said of the lost-volume seller.
b. The supplier with excess capacity.
When the parties agree on a contract price, each party guarantees the other
that he will not have to accept a less favorable one. If, at the time of breach, the
goods or services contracted for command a less favorable price, the breaching
43.
44.
45.
46.

GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 47.
EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 190–91, 218.
Id. at 218.
Id.
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party must pay the difference. Suppose, however, that the goods or services
cannot be sold to anyone else. The party in breach who agreed to pay for them
was the only possible customer.
According to conventional doctrine, the non-breaching party recovers the
contract price minus the scrap value of the goods and any costs he has saved
because he did not have to perform. That remedy makes him as well off as if the
contract had been kept and so protects his “expectation interest.” By our
approach, that is the correct result only sometimes. It depends on what risk the
breaching party assumed. The fact that he assumed the risk that the seller might
have to accept a less favorable offer from a third party does not mean he accepted
the risk that the seller might have no other offers at all.
If the designer of a machine ordered specialty parts of no use to anyone else,
or a producer hires a cast to rehearse and present a play to which no one comes,
surely the risk falls on him. Suppose, however, an entrepreneur invests in an
enterprise and finds that there is only one person to whom he can sell the goods
or services that this enterprise provides. If that person does so and keeps the
contract, the entrepreneur will recover his fixed costs and make a profit. If that
person breaches, according to conventional doctrine, that customer is liable for
the entrepreneur’s lost profit and fixed costs. The premise, again, is that the
entrepreneur’s “expectation interest” should be protected by putting him in as
good a position as if the contract had been kept. By our approach, it is a mistake
to do so without proof that this single customer understood and assumed the risk
that the entrepreneur took when he made such an investment.
In Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp.,47 the plaintiff had invested a large
amount in a factory to waterproof material for shower curtains. The factory
would have stood idle except that the defendant contracted for enough material to
be waterproofed for it to operate at full capacity. The defendant breached his
contract and provided no material to waterproof. As it happened, he was the
plaintiff’s only possible customer. The plaintiff was awarded the amount of his
fixed costs or overhead plus his lost profit, or, to put it another way, the contract
price minus the variable costs, i.e., the costs that were saved because the plaintiff
did not have to process any material. That would be the right result if the goal is
to protect the parties’ expectation interest. The result, however, was to transfer
the risk of the plaintiff’s bad investment to the one customer that he happened to
find.
There is no reason that loss should be borne by that customer. Unless he was
compensated for bearing the added risk, his liability should be no greater than if
he had contracted with a more successful entrepreneur with more potential
customers. If that were the case, the court would have mentioned it. Moreover, it
is unlikely that, as a risk averse party, a buyer would have been willing to bear
this risk for any discount in the price to which the seller would have agreed.

47. 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967).
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c. A contract for insurance cast as a contract of sale.
Although a contract to exchange at an agreed price allocates the risk that
prices will change, it is not a mere bet on what future prices will be. It is the
allocation of a risk that must fall on one party or the other to the party that can
bear it most easily. If a party owns or manufactures goods, he will gain or lose if
the price of those goods rise or fall. If he purchases raw materials to manufacture
a finished product, he will gain or lose if the price of the raw materials falls or
rises. If a party who owns a mine sells ore to a party who plans to turn it into a
finished product, by contracting in advance of delivery, they allocate a risk that
must fall on one party or the other.
If neither party could better bear that risk, or if the risk need not be borne by
either party, the contract would be no different than a bet that gamblers make on
the outcome of a coin flip. The risk of loss, and the chance of gain, only exist
because the gamblers have chosen to create it. As we noted earlier, risk averse
parties do not make such bets. They enter into contracts that allocate risks that
must fall on one party or the other to the party that can bear them most easily.
A contract for the future delivery of generic goods can have this unintended
effect when the price unexpectedly skyrockets. A manufacturer who will gain or
lose depending on the price of raw materials may insure against this risk by
contracting to buy raw materials for future delivery at a fixed price. When he
does so, he transfers part of the risk of doing business to the seller who insures
him against this risk. As Paul Joskow noted, the purpose of such a contract is to
insure against price changes.48
Nevertheless, it does not follow, as Joskow thought, that the seller assumes
the risk of a rise in price, however drastic. 49 Such a contract has the sole purpose
of insuring the buyer against a business risk although it is cast, not in the form of
an insurance contract, but as contract of sale. In a conventional insurance policy,
the amount the insurer can lose will be no greater than the loss that the insured
could suffer. An insurance company will not insure a house for more than its
value. The reason is not simply a fear that the insured might burn the house down
to collect the insurance. It is that parties are normally risk averse. If a risk averse
party wished to insure his house for a million dollars more than its value, there is
no price for the extra insurance that he would be willing to pay that the insurance
company would be willing to accept. The risk of gaining that extra million
dollars is not one that would fall on either party absent the contract. It is a risk
that the parties create just as gamblers would if they bet on a coin flip.
When a rise in the market price is sufficiently drastic, the difference between
the market and the contract price may exceed any financial loss or gain against
which the buyer would wish to insure. In that event, the buyer should not be
48. Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J.
LEG. STUD. 119, 162 (1977).
49. Id.
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made as well off as he would have been had the contract been kept. His recovery
should be limited to what is recognized in insurance law as his “insurable
interest”: the amount of the loss he might have suffered or gain he would have
foregone had he been forced to buy the goods for his own use on the open
market. If the price rose to the point that he would make more by reselling the
goods on the open market than by using them himself, he should not recover the
excess.50 Once again, the law should not protect his “expectation interest.”
The question of what the buyer should recover arose in the Westinghouse
litigation.51 Westinghouse had agreed to provide a continuing supply of uranium
at a fixed price to fuel nuclear generators. The price of uranium then skyrocketed
due to the Arab oil crisis. The case was settled before appeal. One might say that
Westinghouse was foolish for failing to draft the contract with a ceiling on
damages. Its customers might have paid more not to have such a ceiling, but, if
the parties are risk averse, they would not have been willing to compensate
Westinghouse for the risk it assumed if there were no ceiling. But that is another
way of saying that the risk is one that the contract was not intended to place on
Westinghouse and which Westinghouse was not compensated to assume. It was
not simply a bad bet. An event occurred on which the parties were not betting.
According to the official Comment to § 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, relief should not be given when the change in market prices “is exactly the
type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended
to cover.”52 Nevertheless, the same Comment implies that if the market price
rises sufficiently, the difference between market and contract price may exceed
the business risk that the contract was intended to cover. If so, the buyer should
not receive the difference between contract and market price. As the Comment
observes:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is
due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of
performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification
for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at
fixed prices are intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of
supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure,
unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes
a market increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies
necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section . . . .53
According to the Comment, if “a marked increase in costs” is caused by “a
severe shortage of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local
crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like,” the

50. JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 350–51 (2006).
51. See generally Joskow, supra note 48.
52. U.C.C. § 2-615, cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011).
53. Id.
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“expectation interest” of the buyer should not be protected.
One reason for thinking that the Comment means what it says is that it was
drafted by Karl Llewellyn who was thoroughly familiar with German law. It is
hard for someone familiar with German law to read this Comment without
thinking of the earliest cases in which the highest German court for civil matters
gave relief for severe and unexpected changes in the market price. In one case,
the outbreak of World War I caused the price of steam to soar. 54 In another in
which the German collapse in 1918 caused a huge increase in the price of iron
wire.55 Llewellyn’s friend Stefan Riesenfeld was fond of recounting a
conversation in which he asked Llewellyn whether he had drawn on German law
in drafting Article 2. He answered, “Of course. But I left no evidence that I
did,”56 which was an understandable precaution to take drafting an American
model statute within a decade after the end of World War II.
d. A hedged bet.
In the cases we have just discussed, the non-breaching party was worse off
than if the contract had been enforced but not because he had to accept a price
less favorable than the one guaranteed to him by the contract. In rare situations,
the non-breaching party may be no worse off, even though he had to accept a less
favorable price.
An example is KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network. 57 The defendant
contracted to sell lettuce to the plaintiff at nine cents per pound. When the price
rose, the defendant breached its contract and sold the lettuce to a third party at the
higher price. The plaintiff covered by buying lettuce at the higher price, which it
processed and resold to third parties. The plaintiff was no worse off, however,
because its contracts to resell the lettuce were not fixed-price but cost-plus.
Consequently, it was able to pass along the higher price that it paid to its
customers.
The court awarded the plaintiff the difference between the higher price it
paid for the lettuce and the contract price. That result would be wrong if the
purpose of giving a remedy is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed. Nevertheless, the court
reached the right result. The parties bet on whether the price of lettuce would rise
or fall, and the non-breaching party won the bet. Because he hedged his bets, he
received a windfall. If he were not allowed to recover, however, the windfall
would go to the breaching party who was the party that lost the bet. Moreover,
54.
100, 129.
55.
103, 177.
56.
1999.
57.

Reichsgericht [RG] Sept. 21, 1920, ENSTSCHEIDENGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ]
Reichsgericht [RG] Nov. 29, 1921, ENSTSCHEIDENGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ]
A story which Riesenfeld told the author several times while we were colleagues at Berkeley, 1978–
42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286 288 (Cal. App. 1995).
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the contract guaranteed the breaching party that he would receive the contract
price even if the market price of lettuce fell. The non-breaching party provided
that guarantee. It should not matter that, by entering into another transaction, the
non-breaching party provided the guarantee at no risk to himself.
2. The requirement that damages be foreseeable.
According to conventional doctrine, the party in breach is liable on for harm
that he could reasonably have foreseen at the time he contracted. Section 351 of
the Second Restatement provides:
1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.
(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it
follows from the breach
(a) in the ordinary course of events, or
(b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events,
that the party in breach had reason to know.
a. Some history.
The foreseeability limitation was established in England in 1854 in the
famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale.58 In that case, the plaintiff’s mill was
stopped because a shaft was broken. The plaintiff hired the defendant to transport
the shaft to a manufacturer so that it could serve as a model for a new one.
Transportation was delayed due to the defendant’s breach of contract, and the
plaintiff sued for the profits he had lost because the mill was stopped for a longer
period of time. The court denied recovery on the grounds that this harm was not
foreseeable at the time the contract was made.
The court in Hadley was adopting a rule that had been proposed by the
French jurist Robert Pothier (1699–1772), whence it passed first into the French
Civil Code.59 Pothier had borrowed the idea that foreseeability should limit
liability from an earlier century French jurist, Charles Du Moulin (1500–66). Du
Moulin and Pothier arrived at their conclusion by combining two rules of Roman
law, neither of which concerned foreseeability.
One has already been described. The party in breach is liable for damages
circa rem, or as Pothier proposed, propter rem ipsam, but only in special
situations for damages extra rem. According to Du Moulin and Pothier, the
reason that the damages were recoverable if they were circa rem or propter rem
ipsam was that the party in breach could have foreseen them at the time he
contracted.
According to Du Moulin, this reason explained another Roman rule, one
58. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
59. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 9, at 830.
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which limited the amount of damages that could be recovered for breach of
contract. According to a poorly drafted Roman law, in contracts for a certum, the
non-breaching party could recover no more than “twofold.”60 Since the Middle
Ages, jurists had spent much effort discussing what was meant by certum
(certain) and what must be multiplied by two to determine the limit of recovery.
Du Moulin suggested a rationale for the rule: “Most likely it was not foreseen or
thought that greater damage would be suffered or that there was a risk beyond the
principal object than the principal object itself.”61 Pothier presented Du Moulin’s
rationale as though it were, not an explanation, but a rule in its own right: “The
person who owes a performance is only liable for the damages that one could
have foreseen at the time of the contract that the party owed a performance would
suffer.”62
Thus, a Roman rule against recovering damages that are disproportionately
high had become a rule against recovering damages that are unforeseeable.
Moreover, a rule providing for the recovery of damages that were circa rem had
become a rule that provided for the recovery of these damages because they were
foreseeable. The first step had been taken toward the end result we have seen in
the Restatement where the distinction between direct and consequential damages
is eclipsed by the distinction between damages that are or are not foreseeable in
the ordinary course of events.
In Hadley v. Baxendale, Baron Parke still described these damages as those
which are “directly and immediately results from the non-performance of the
contract,” quoting Sedwick’s translation of the version of Pothier’s rule which
had been enacted in the French Civil Code. 63 Baron Alderson, delivering the
judgment of the court, described these damages as “arising naturally, i.e.,
according to the usual course of things, from such breach of [the] contract
itself.”64 But if the reason the party in breach is liable is because he could have
foreseen them, then, as in the Second Restatement, all that should matter is
whether they arise “according to the usual course of things,” since that is the
reason they were foreseeable. As Lord Asquith said in Victoria Laundry
(Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries, Ltd., “[e]veryone, as a reasonable person,
is taken to know the ‘ordinary course of things’ and consequently what loss is
liable to result from a breach [of contract] in that ordinary course.” 65
The decision in Hadley did not make it clear when damages can be recovered
if they do not “aris[e] naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from
[the] breach of the contract itself.” Was it enough that they were foreseeable?

60. CODE JUST. 7.47.1 (Justinian 530).
61. CAROLUS MOLINAEUS, TRACTATUS DE EO QUOD INTEREST, no. 60 (1574).
62. ROBERT POTHIER, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS, no. 160, in 2 OEUVRES DE POTHIER 497 (Bugnet ed.,
2d ed., 1861).
63. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 148.
64. Id. at 151.
65. [1949] 2 KB 528 (Ct. App.).
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It would seem so. Baron Alderson said “if the special circumstances under
which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the
defendants . . . the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which
they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury [that] would
ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so
known and communicated.”66
On the other hand, Goldberg has shown that Hadley need not be read that
way, and that, for a long time, it was not. In Hadley, surprisingly enough, the
special circumstances under which the contract was made actually were
communicated to the defendants. A headnote to the case said: “The plaintiff’s
servant told the [defendant’s] clerk that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft
must be sent immediately. . . .”67 Goldberg has shown that the headnote was
“[a]lmost certainly not” a reporter’s error. 68 In 1856, two years after the decision,
James William Smith and Sir Henry Singer Keating, who had been the attorneys
for Hadley and for Baxendale, respectively, mentioned the communication to the
clerk in their book, A Selection of Leading Cases on Various Branches of the
Law.69 Sir Roger Crompton, the trial court judge in Hadley v. Baxendale, said, in
a later opinion: “The curious part of the case is that there was a most distinct
notification to the carrier of the consequences that would follow the non-delivery
of the shaft, and the Court held that these consequences could not be taken into
consideration.”70 Despite what he said, could Baron Alderson have thought that
the communication did not matter?
Be that as it may, Goldberg has shown that “[f]or almost a century, the
courts, relying on Hadley v. Baxendale, restricted recovery for consequential
damages to those damages to which the promisor had tacitly agreed.” 71 Twelve
years after Hadley, in British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship, the court held
that “the mere fact of knowledge cannot increase liability. The knowledge must
be brought home to the party sought to be charged, under such circumstances that
the person he contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the contract with
the special condition attached to it.” 72 Goldberg quoted the 11th edition of
Mayne’s Treatise on Damages published in 1946 in which the authors asked: “Is
mere knowledge or communication sufficient to impose liability?” They thought
that conclusion was unlikely, given that the carrier in Hadley had been told that
the mill was stopped, and that the result would be that a “party, by acquainting
[the other party] with further consequences which the law would not have
implied, [could] enlarge his responsibility to the full extent of those
66. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151.
67. Id. at 147.
68. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 166.
69. 431 (4th ed., 1856), quoted in GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 166.
70. Simmons v. Patchett [1857] 26 QB 195 at 197, quoted in GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra
note 29, at 166.
71. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 165.
72. [1868] 3 LRCP 499, 508–09, quoted in GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 167.
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consequences, without a contract to that effect.”73
According to Goldberg, the rule “changed abruptly” in 1949 with Lord
Justice Cyril Asquith’s opinion in Victoria Laundry v. Newman. Asquith denied
that in Hadley, the plaintiff’s servant had communicated that the mill was
stopped. The headnote was “misleading.” Asquith distinguished the “first rule”
and the “second rule” of Hadley v. Baxendale. According to the first rule,
“[e]veryone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know . . . what loss is liable to
result from a breach of contract in [the] ordinary course.” According to the
second rule, “he actually possesses [knowledge] of special circumstances outside
the ‘ordinary course of things,’ of such a kind that a breach in those special
circumstances would be liable to cause more loss.” In that event, the “additional
loss is also recoverable.”
By this route, the common law arrived at the rule formulated in the Second
Restatement. As long as the damages were foreseeable in the ordinary course of
events, it does not matter whether they are circa rem, natural, general, or direct.
It does not matter whether they were disproportionately high.
b. An alternative to “foreseeability.”
The rationale for the rule, according to Baron Alderson in his opinion in
Hadley v. Baxendale, is that “had the special circumstances [leading to
unforeseen injury] been known, the parties might have specially provided for the
breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case.” 74 That may
be. But why assume that the breaching party is willing to be liable for the
damages he does foresee unless he agrees to be? Why would he have agreed
unless he charged an extra amount?
Sophisticated economic defenses of the rule have been based on the same
assumption. According to Richard Posner, the foreseeability rule “induces the
party with knowledge of the risk either to take appropriate precautions himself,
or, if he believes that the other party might be the more efficient preventer or
spreader (insurer) of the loss, to reveal the risk to that party and pay him to
assume it.”75 According to Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, the foreseeability rule
will force the party who knows that harm may occur to accept liability for it or to
convey that information to who may be best able to prevent it. If not,
presumably, he will refuse to accept liability. If the party receiving the
information agreed to assume liability, charging extra for doing so, he ought to
be liable.76 The trouble is that the foreseeability rule does not require this party to

73. MAYNE’S TREATISE ON DAMAGES 28–29 (W.E. Earnengy ed., 11th ed., London, 1946), quoted in
GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 165.
74. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151.
75. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 141 (7th ed., 2007).
76. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 104 (1989).
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agree but merely that he be informed and, having been informed, foresee the loss
that might occur.
By our approach, what should matter is whether the party in breach assumed
the risk of the harm that ensued. Our conclusion is that the best formulated rule
was that of Bartolus nearly seven hundred years ago. Damages should be
recoverable if the harm is direct (circa rem), or if it would be typically be
incurred by any non-breaching party (sequitur rem penes quecumque vadat).
In the case of direct damages, responsibility for a risk is allocated by the
terms of the contract. If the damages are direct, they will have been expected to
occur in the ordinary course, and so will be recoverable under what Lord Asquith
called the first rule of Hadley v. Baxendale and under the Second Restatement
§ 351(2)(a). But that is not why they should be recoverable. They should be
recoverable because a contracting party should be liable for the risks he assumed.
In the case of consequential damages for lost profits, the party in breach may
or may not have assumed the risk. Parties that are risk averse will place a risk on
the party that can bear it at the lowest cost and then adjust the price to
compensate him for bearing it. As we have seen, if the adverse consequences
differ from one customer or client to the next, the breaching party will be
compensated for bearing it only if he charges a higher price to those customers
for whom the adverse consequences are likely to be abnormally large. He should
not be liable to a party who suffers an abnormally large amount for harm unless
that party paid an extra amount for him to assume the extra risk.
What should matter, then, is not whether or not these damages are
foreseeable. What should matter is whether they were likely to have been much
higher for the non-breaching party than for others for whom the party in breach
provides the same goods or services. Despite Lord Asquith’s statement of the
second rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, and despite § 351(2)(b) of the Second
Restatement, those are the circumstances in which many courts have given relief.
An example is Hadley v. Baxendale itself. The plaintiff’s servant told the
defendant’s clerk the mill was stopped. By our approach, the plaintiff should not
recover unless he paid the defendant an extra amount to assume the risk that a
late delivery would cause a loss of profits. Very likely, he did not. He was
charged the same amount as other customers who were shipping a package of the
same weight or volume for the same distance.
The Second Restatement gives an illustration based on Hadley in which
recovery is denied even though a carrier knows that a factory will lose profits if
delivery is delayed:
A, a private trucker, contracts with B to deliver to B’s factory a machine
that has just been repaired and, without which B’s factory, as A knows,
cannot reopen. Delivery is delayed because A’s truck breaks down. In an
action by B against A for breach of contract the court may, after taking
into consideration such factors as the absence of an elaborate written
contract and the extreme disproportion between B’s loss of profits during
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the delay and the price of the trucker’s services, exclude recovery for
loss of profits.77
Presumably, the absence of an elaborate written contract matters because
such a contract would have placed the risk on the trucker, if he has wished to
assume it. In that case, presumably it would have charged a higher price. But
why should the extreme disproportion and the absence of a written contract make
the damages unforeseeable?
Indeed, there is a line of cases stretching back almost to Hadley v. Baxendale
that deny recovery when damages were disproportionate but seem to be
foreseeable.78 Recovery was denied for a loss of profits caused by providing a
ship with defects, 79 by providing tires with defects, 80 for failing to provide boilers
on time,81 for failing to finish building a railroad, 82 for failing to provide a
machine for drying bricks with as much capacity as promised, 83 for failing to
dress stones for the plaintiff’s mill, 84 and for failing to return machinery on
time.85 There are, indeed, courts that held it to be enough that the plaintiff had
informed the defendant of the loss it would suffer in the event of breach. For
example, in Cook Associates v. Wanick,86 the Utah Supreme Court awarded
damages for lost profits when the late delivery of parts by a supplier prevented a
manufacturing plant from opening on time. It is not surprising that when a rule is
repeated often enough, a court sometimes will follow it even when it leads to a
bad result.
In Cook, the court noted the defendant “asserts that there was no evidence
that the parties ‘mutually [understood] that lost profits [would] be included in
damages should breach occur.’”87 According to the court, it did not matter. It
should.
3. The requirement that damages be established with certainty.
Another limitation on damages recognized by conventional doctrine is that
they must be proven with a higher degree of certainty than damages in tort, or the

77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351, illus. 17 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
78. Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default Theory and
Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L. JOUR. 339, 345–60 (1998).
79. Sundance Cruises Corp. v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 7 F.3d 1077, 1084 (2d Cir. 1993).
80. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith, 43 F.2d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1930).
81. McEwen v. McKinnon, 11 N.W. 828, 830 (Mich. 1882).
82. Snell v. Cottingham, 72 Ill. 161, 170 (1874).
83. Moulthrop v. Hyett, 17 So. 32, 33–34 (Ala. 1895) (although the court added that damages were
remote and speculative).
84. Fleming v. Beck, 48 Pa. 309, 312 (1864).
85. Armstrong & Latta v. City of Philadelphia, 94 A. 455, 458 (Pa. 1915).
86. 664 P.2d 1161(Utah 1983).
87. Id. at 1167.
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other elements of the plaintiff’s claim in contract.
A party should be liable for the risks that he assumed. At the beginning of
this Article, we identified three risks. Two are allocated by the terms of the
contract. We have referred to them as direct damages. One is the risk of losing a
more favorable bargain. When the parties contract for goods or services, they
assume the risk that their market price may rise or fall. Problems of certainty can
arise in long-term contracts in which a commodity is sold for delivery over a
period of years. They can also arise when, in return for his own performance, a
party is to receive the profits or a share in the profits of some enterprise. The
amount of these profits may be uncertain. In these cases, there is no reason why
difficulties of proof should be any more of an obstacle to recovery than with any
other element of the plaintiff’s case. We will see that courts do not require any
greater degree of certainty.
A second risk is that performance may cost more than estimated. Here, again,
the damages of a breach of contract are direct. That risk, like the first, is allocated
by the terms of the contract. We will see, surprisingly enough, that courts require
a lesser degree of certainty in the proof of lost profits than they would otherwise.
We will see why they are correct to do so.
A third risk is that a breach of contract will cause the non-breaching party
consequential damages, such as loss of the opportunity to enter into profitable
transactions with third parties. Here, as we will see, whether damages should be
awarded should not depend on the degree of certainty with which they can be
established. It should depend on whether the party in breach assumed the risk of
liability for consequential damages. Where he did depends on the same
considerations which we discussed in the last section on foreseeability.
a. The risk of a change in the value in the contracted for
performance.
As discussed earlier, if parties contracted to give or receive a commodity
with a market price, one party will gain if the market price rises, and the other
will lose if the market price falls. Having assumed that risk, the breaching party
should be liable for the difference between the contract price and the market
value at the time of breach.
This amount may be hard to estimate. Nevertheless, there is no reason that
the non-breaching party should have to prove it with any greater certainty than
any other element in his case. In Tractebel Energy Mtg. Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg,
Inc.,88 the Second Circuit, applying New York law, allowed the plaintiff to
recover lost profits on a long-term contract. AEP had contracted to build a plant
to sell steam to Dow Chemical and electricity to Tractebel. Tractebel agreed to
buy at least $50,000,000 of electricity and repudiated the contract when the price

88. 487 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
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of electricity fell. The district court had refused to award damages because “[a]ny
projection of lost profits would necessarily include assumptions regarding the
price of electricity and the costs of operating over twenty years.” 89 The Court of
Appeal reversed, noting that, “[t]he variables identified by the district court exist
in every long-term contract.”90 The non-breaching party should recover because
the damages are general, or, as we would say, direct:
By contrast, when the non-breaching party seeks only to recover money that
the breaching party agreed to pay under the contract, the damages sought are
general damages. . . .The damages may still be characterized as lost profits . . .
[b]ut, in this case, the lost profits are the direct and probable consequence of the
breach. . . .AEP seeks only what it bargained for—the amount it would have
profited on the payments TEMI promised to make for the remaining years of the
contract. This is most certainly a claim for general damages. 91
In Tractebel, the party in breach had contracted to buy electricity from the
non-breaching party and repudiated the contract when the market price of
electricity fell. The non-breaching party recovered the difference between the
contract and market price of electricity. The difficulty in proving damages arose
because the future price of electricity was uncertain.
It may happen that, in return for his own performance, a party is to receive
profits or the share of the profits in some enterprise. He assumes the risk that the
profits will be higher or lower. As before, if the other party breaches the contract,
he should recover the profits to which he was entitled.
As before, there is no reason that the non-breaching party should have to
prove these profits with any greater degree of certainty than any other element of
his case. The court’s estimate, like that of the parties, may be too high or too low,
but it is more likely to correspond to the amount of lost profits than if the court
required greater certainty. Such a requirement always means an award of less
than the amount that profits are estimated to be. A refusal to give relief on the
grounds of uncertainty would mean an award of zero damages. In either case, a
party who assumed the risk of how profitable an enterprise was will escape some
or all of the liability for the risk he assumed.
Of course, there are difficulties of proof. As Victor Goldberg noted, even
though proof may require “some sophisticated work by economic experts, . . .
this is an exercise that the parties routinely go though in negotiating a
settlement.”92 Melvin Eisenberg pointed out that when the parties themselves
estimate the future value of an investment, they make the same projections that a
court would make in awarding damages.93
At present, the rules are unclear. Goldberg noted that “some case law

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 109–10.
GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 25.
EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 233–34.
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suggests that the standard of proof is higher for consequential damages” than it is
for direct damages.94 The Second Restatement of Contracts does not recognize
this distinction. It provides: “Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an
amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.”95
That rule is said to be a “limitation” on the recovery of damages. According to
the Official Comment, this limitation “merely excludes those elements of loss
that cannot be proved with reasonable certainty” and also that it is compatible
with the decisions of “[c]ourts [which] have traditionally required greater
certainty in the proof of damages for breach of a contract than in the proof of
damages for a tort.”96 Finally, as Goldberg noted, “[s]ome courts have concluded
that all lost profits claims are for consequential damages.” 97
According to Eisenberg, the requirement of greater certainty is a hangover
from 19th century contract law: “Under classical contract law the degree of
certainty required was typically set at a high level . . . This approach, which has
been carried over in some modern cases, is exemplified in two decisions by the
New York Court of Appeals, Freund v. Washington Square Press and Kenford
Co. v. Erie County.”98
In Freund, Washington Square Press agreed to publish a book which Freund
was to write, and the parties were to share the royalties. 99 In Kenford, Erie
County agreed to construct a domed stadium and to lease it to an affiliate of
Kenford, or, if the parties were unable to agree on the terms, to hire the affiliate
to manage the stadium in return for a percentage of the stadium’s gross
revenues.100 In both cases, the court denied recovery on the ground that the
plaintiff’s damages were too uncertain.
According to Eisenberg, “[t]his approach is dramatically out of touch with
the reality of probability . . . .”101 “Many modern courts have properly broken
away from the binary, economically uniformed, all-or-nothing approach to
uncertainty taken by classical contract law.”102 To illustrate the modern approach,
he cited three cases applying New York law. In Ashland Management, Inc. v.
Janien, the plaintiff had been promised royalties of 15% on a computerized
investment model he had developed for the defendant.103 In Contemporary
Mission v. Famous Music Corp., the plaintiff had been assigned the exclusive
right to the master tape of a rock opera and records made from the master to the

94. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 171.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
96. Id. at cmt. a.
97. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 172.
98. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 227.
99. Freund v. Washington Square Press, 314 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1975).
100. Kenford Co. v. Erie County, 493 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1986).
101. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 229.
102. Id. at 234.
103. 624 N.E.2d 1007 (N.Y. 1993).
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plaintiff, who was to receive royalties on the sales. 104 The defendant was to
promote the records. In Lexington Products Ltd. v. B.D. Communications, Inc.,105
in return for an exclusive license, the defendant agreed to market the plaintiff’s
toothbrush, to purchase 200,000 toothbrushes a year, and to pay royalties on each
brush sold. He also cited a Massachusetts case, Rombola v. Consindas,106 in
which the plaintiff agreed to train, maintain, and race the defendant’s horse in
return for 75% of the amount of all gross purses that the horse won. In all of
these cases, the plaintiff recovered on the basis of evidence as to the profits he
has failed to make: projections on the success of the investment model; data
about the success for other records that had done as well as the one plaintiff had
recorded but defendant failed to promote; estimates of the sales of toothbrushes;
the past track record of the horse.
Eisenberg is right that Freund was wrongly decided. So was Kenford—or if
the result was right it was not because damages were uncertain. 107 But these
decisions are not relics of the past.
In 1817, in Gale v. Leckie, the defendant breached an agreement to provide a
manuscript which the plaintiff would publish. The profits were to be equally
divided. Lord Ellenborough allowed the jury to estimate the plaintiff’s lost
profits.108 In McNeil v. Reid, the defendant breached a contract to make the
plaintiff a partner in defendant’s firm. The jury was allowed to estimate the
profits the plaintiff would have made as a partner. 109 Both of these English cases
were cited by the New York Court of Appeals in 1853 in Bagley v. Smith. The
court allowed the plaintiff to recover the profit he lost when the defendant
breached a contract to continue a partnership with him for a fixed period.110
Similarly, in 1868, in Taylor v. Bradley, the Court of Appeals awarded the profit
the plaintiff lost when the defendant breached a contract with him to lease a farm
and share the profits. The court acknowledged that the profit “depends upon
details more or less contingent and speculative.” Yet “the plaintiff is entitled to
the value of his contract. . . . [H]e is deprived of his adventure.”111 In 1908, in
Nash v. Thousand Island Steamboat Co., the New York Appellate Division
allowed the plaintiff to recover the profits he would have made had the defendant
not breached a contract giving him “the exclusive souvenir, confectionery, view
book, news, and parcel checking privileges on these six steamers during the three
years named . . . .”112 The trial court denied the plaintiffs recovery “upon the
104. 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1977).
105. 677 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1982).
106. 220 N.E.2d 919 (Mass. 1966).
107. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 236 (construing Rombola v. Consindas,
220 N.E.2d 919, 922 (Mass. 1966)).
108. Gale v. Leckie (1817) 105 Eng. Rep. 1228.
109. McNeil v. Reid (1832) 131 Eng. Rep. 540.
110. Bagley v. Smith, 10 N.Y. 489 (1853).
111. Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N.Y. 129, 144 (1868).
112. Nash v. Thousand Island Steamboat Co., 108 N.Y.S. 336, 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908).
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ground that they did not and could not show what profits they would have made
if the contract had been performed by the defendants.” The Appellate Division
reversed, noting that “[t]here must always be difficulty in determining what
future profits would arise from conditions that never come about.”113
By our approach, these cases were correctly decided because in all of them,
including those cited by Eisenberg, a party contracted in return for a share of the
profits of some enterprise: the profits of a partnership (McNeil, Bagley); the
profits from publishing a manuscript (Gale); or the purses won by racing a horse
(Rombola). In some, the parties were to share royalties (Ashland, Contemporary
Mission, Lexington Products), and one can cite others.114
Indeed, the only cases we have described in which the plaintiff was promised
a share in the proceeds of a venture and in which recovery was denied are Freund
and Kenford. In those two cases, as Eisenberg notes, the court should not have
required a greater degree of certainty in the proof of damages. 115
Goldberg also believes that in such cases the non-breaching party should
recover direct damages. His reason is that the non-breaching party is entitled to
what Goldberg calls the value of his contract as an asset. When a party contracts
to give or receive a fungible commodity, the value of the asset at the time of
breach is the difference between the market price and the contract price of the
commodity. When a party contracts in return for a share of profits, the value of
the asset is the estimated value of those profits at the time of breach. “Contracts
assign the risks of market change. If the market price goes up and the seller
breaches, the buyer’s damages are the difference between the contract and market
price.” Some “‘lost profits’ are clearly direct damages. They give the claimant
the benefit of the bargain.”116
That analysis is different but consistent with our own. By our approach,
contract remedies should hold each party responsible for the risks that he has
been compensated to assume. One is the risk of losing a more favorable bargain.
The seller of goods at a fixed price gives up the chance to profit if the market
price rises to avoid the risk of losing if the market price falls. A party who
contracts for a share of profits is entitled to that share.
Be that as it may, American courts were dealing with such cases by asking
113. Id. at 342.
114. Perma Research & Devel. Co. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976); MindGames Inc. v.
Western Publ. Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
115. Goldberg noted that Kenford may have been rightly decided but for a different reason. The plaintiff
was trying to recover the profits that he would have made by investing in a domed stadium. The court held that
the lost profits were too uncertain. The mistake, according to Goldberg, was to neglect the possibility that the
plaintiff was then free to invest in some other project that might have been equally profitable. GOLDBERG,
RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 228–31.
116. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 175. Goldberg was speaking of the special
case of “indirect compensation,” in which, for example, instead of paying a distributor a set price for retailing
services, a manufacturer sells to him for resale at a markup. His argument carries over to any case in which the
benefit of the bargain is to obtain profits or a share in the profits. He mentions the case of licensing for a share
in the royalties. Id. at 173.
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whether damages were direct before they professed a concern for whether the
damages were certain. Some courts borrowed Pothier’s limitation to damages
that were, in his words, propter rem ipsam, or, in Evan’s translation, “in respect
to the particular thing which is the object of [it].” 117 Although they were
borrowing from Pothier, they treated these words as a limitation in themselves
with little or no attention to whether they were foreseeable. These words from
Evan’s translation were quoted by the New York Supreme Court in 1839 in
Blanchard v. Ely. The New York Supreme Court denied recovery for the profit
the buyer would have made from the timely delivery of a steamboat. 118 In 1845,
the Blanchard opinion was quoted in Masterton & Smith v. Mayor of Brooklyn to
allow the seller to recover for breach of contract for the manufacture and delivery
of marble.119 The court added that such damages were “contemplated” by the
parties. In 1848, the Blanchard opinion was quoted again in Freeman v. Clute to
deny the buyer damages for the profits he lost during a three month delay in
providing a suitable steam engine.120 In time, this limitation was supplemented121
or replaced 122 by the rule that the plaintiff must prove his damages with a greater
degree of certainty.
b. The risk of the cost of performance.
Sometimes goods or services are to be provided when it is not certain what
the cost of providing them will be. The goods have yet to manufactured, and it is
not certain how expensive it will be to manufacture them. The services have yet
to be performed, and it is not certain how much it will cost to provide them. The
parties must allocate the risk that the cost of performance will prove to be more
or less than the amount they estimate in advance. If they make a cost-plus
contract, that risk is placed on the party who is to receive the performance. If
they make a fixed-price contract, the party who is to perform assumes the risk of
a cost overrun but can keep the extra profit if costs are less than they were
estimated to be.
If the party who was to receive the performance breaches, the other party
should receive the amount of the profit he would have made he had been allowed
117. ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, OR CONTRACTS 75 (William
David Evans trans., 1839).
118. Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342, 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
119. Masterton & Smith v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 9 Hill 61, 68–69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (holding that
damages cannot be recovered when they have “no legal or necessary connection with the stipulations between
the parties, and cannot therefore be presumed to have entered into their consideration at the time of
contracting. . . . [P]rofits or advantages which are the direct and immediate fruits of the contract entered into
between the parties, stand upon a different footing. These are part and parcel of the contract itself, entering into
and constituting a portion of its very elements.”) (citing Evans’ Poth. 91).
120. Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. 424, 427 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1848).
121. Masterton & Smith v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 9 Hill 61, 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Wakeman v. Wheeler
& Wilson Mfg. Co., 4 N.E. 264, 266 (N.Y. 1886).
122. Griffen v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 493 (1858).
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to perform. The reason is not that, in principle, he should be put in as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract been performed. The reason is
the allocation of risks established by the terms of the contract. As he would have
lost in the event of a cost overrun, so he would win if he completed the work for
less than the contract price.
Some courts have said that the standard of proof should be lower because the
loss of profits in this situation is direct. In 1851, in Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co.
v. Howard, the plaintiff contracted “to furnish . . . building materials . . .
[w]orkmanship and labor” to a railroad. 123 In holding the defendant liable for the
plaintiff’s lost profits, the United States Supreme Court said, again quoting the
language of Pothier:
Actual damages clearly include the direct and actual loss which the
plaintiff sustains propter rem ipsam non habitam. And in case of a
contract like this, that loss is, among other things, the difference between
the cost of doing the work and the price to be paid for it. This difference
is the inducement and real consideration which causes the contractor to
enter into the contract. For this he expends his time, exerts his skill, uses
his capital, and assumes the risks which attend the enterprise. And to
deprive him of it, when the other party has broken the contract and
unlawfully put an end to the work, would be unjust. There is no rule of
law which requires us to inflict this injustice. Wherever profits are
spoken of as not a subject of damages, it will be found that something
contingent upon future bargains, or speculations, or states of the market,
are referred to, and not the difference between the agreed price of
something contracted for and its ascertainable value, or cost.124
More recently, in Franklin v. Demico, Inc.,125 the defendant breached a
contract in which the plaintiff was to manufacture circuit boards to its
specifications. The court said:
There is no merit in Franklin’s argument that the amount is not proved
because it includes profits, which must be shown with a requisite degree
of certainty. . . .Franklin is confusing the legal concepts appropriate to
profits which might accrue collaterally as a result of the contract’s
performance and profits necessarily inherent in the contract, which are
always provable. . . .Although we acknowledge that, as the dissent
contends, the complex and confusing mathematical methodology used in
this case does not produce exact arithmetical accuracy, we must
nevertheless presume that the trial judge, as trier of the facts, separated
123. 54 U.S. 307, 309.
124. Id. at 344.
125. 347 S.E.2d 718 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
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the wheat from the chaff.126
One might expect that in this situation, lost profits should be established with
the same degree of certainty as other direct damages. One might even expect that
lost profits should be established with a greater degree of certainty. Yet the
opposite is true. The degree of certainty that courts require is less, and rightly so.
The reason one might expect the courts to require a greater degree of
certainty is that this situation is not like one where a party is to receive profits or
a share of profits in return for his own performance. There, the parties themselves
will have had to estimate the amount of the profits. If they can do so, the courts
should try to do so as well. In that situation, however, the parties are not betting
against each other. If the profits are larger than expected, the party to receive
them will obtain more, and if they are smaller, he will obtain less. But his gain is
not the other party’s loss, nor his loss the other party’s gain. That is so even,
though, if the profits had been more accurately estimated in advance. That
estimate would have effected the share of the profits that a party could have
successfully demanded as compensation. For example, if the profits on a book
are much greater than expected, both the author and the publisher will win out,
although, if the parties had known in advance how successful the book would be,
the author could have demanded a greater share of the royalties.
In contrast, in a contract to pay a fixed price for goods that have yet to be
manufactured or a service yet to be performed, the parties are betting against
each other. The party who is to manufacture or to perform assumes the risk of a
cost overrun but can keep the extra profit if costs are less than they were
estimated to be. The reason for making a fixed price contract is that it is uncertain
in advance what the costs will be. It would seem that to allow the non-breaching
party to recover lost profits is to allow him to recover on a bet he made but never
won.
Nevertheless, courts have correctly held that the contractor who is prevented
from performing should recover his lost profits even if they remain uncertain.
The party who hired the contractor should not be allowed to walk away from his
own commitment. He took a risk when he hired the contractor—he gave up the
opportunity of accepting a more favorable offer from another contractor. The
contractor also took a risk. It is true that the contractor, like a lost volume seller,
did not give up the opportunity to accept other offers. Since he subcontracts the
work out to others, he can accept as many offers as he receives. Nevertheless, he
committed himself to perform at a fixed price and so took the risk of a cost
overrun. If he had offered to do the work at a higher price, he would have
lessened this risk. He set a lower price to get a commitment from the party who
126. Id. at 779. According to the dissent, “[h]aving essentially laid the foundation for the recovery of
damages resulting from the breach, plaintiff needed only to attach some relevant figures regarding the costs of
production and costs of material purchased, less the amounts received from salvage or other utilization of such
materials, but it did not do so.” Id. at 722.
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hired him. That party should be held responsible for the risk that the contractor
assumed. He should not be able to accept a more favorable offer from someone
else, and then, having prevented the contractor from performing, to refuse to pay
because the cost of performance is uncertain.
Consequently, courts correctly have allowed the contractor to recover lost
profits based on no more evidence than the estimates he used to compile his bid.
In American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy Bros. Const., Inc.,127 the defendant
breached its contract by rejecting the plaintiff’s low bid. The plaintiff was
allowed to recover by presenting in evidence of “its calculated cost and profits
for each item listed in the . . . bid form.”128 In Alaska Children’s Services, Inc. v.
Smart, 129 the jury found that the plaintiff had been awarded a roofing contract
after making the lowest bid. The defendant breached by firing him and hiring a
competing bidder who was allowed to rebid: “The evidence as to lost profits in
this case was Smart’s testimony that his profit on the ACS job would have been
between $15,000 and $18,000 and that his normal profit percentage was ‘usually
anywhere from 18 to 25%.’”130 Similarly, in Foster v. United Home Imp. Co.,
Inc.,131 the defendant contracted with one developer and then, before he could
begin work, contracted for the same project with another. The court allowed the
first developer to recover on the basis of his own testimony as to “his expected
profit on the total job—based on his experience in construction work since
1954. . . .[He] explained such figure was calculated as the difference between the
contract price and his anticipated expenses.” 132 The court dismissed the
defendant’s objection that “(t)he only evidence in the record is the bald assertion
by [the plaintiff] that he would have made such profit.”133
The problem is similar when a manufacturer contracts to produce custommade goods of use only to the buyer. If the buyer breaches the contract before the
manufacturer has a chance to produce them, there may be little evidence of what
it would have cost to perform beyond the estimates used to set the price offered.
Yet again, the reason the manufacturer could not prove the costs of performance
was that the defendant prevented it from doing so by breaching the contract. In
Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Products, Inc.,134 the Connecticut Supreme Court
allowed such a manufacturer to recover lost profits based on plaintiff’s testimony
“about the elements he considered in pricing the job.”135 The court admitted that
“his cost and price estimates about the actual production run were necessarily
127. 670 S.W.2d 798 (Ark. 1984).
128. Id. at 799.
129. 677 P.2d 899 (Alaska 1984).
130. Id. at 902. The court said this evidence was “bolstered” by testimony from the competing bidders
that they included a similar profit margin in their bids. Id.
131. 428 N.E.2d 1351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
132. Id. at 1357.
133. Id.
134. 439 A.2d 314 (Conn. 1981).
135. Id. at 320–21.
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theoretical, since [the defendant’s] breach made it impossible to go forward with
the production that would have made historically accurate figures available.” 136
But he should recover precisely because “the plaintiff’s difficulty in quantifying
his damages often flows directly from the defendant’s breach,” and therefore the
court would “require that degree of proof of damages which the facts permit, but
no more.”137
c. The risk of losing profits on other transactions.
Another risk is that because of the breach of contract, a party will lose the
opportunity to enter into profitable transactions with third parties. The plaintiff
who seeks to recover lost profits is seeking damages that are not direct but
consequential.
In such cases, courts have sometimes denied recovery on the grounds that the
damages were not established with certainty. By our approach, recovery should
sometimes be denied. But the reason is not a lack of certainty. As in the case of
the rule that damages must have been foreseeable, what matters is neither
certainty nor foreseeability but whether the party in breach assumed the risk that
the non-breaching party would lose the profit he would otherwise make by
entering into transactions with others.
Whether the party in breach assumed the risk depends on the same
considerations that we discussed earlier in dealing with foreseeability. The party
in breach is often in the best position to bear a risk because he can spread the risk
among similar transactions, charging each customer a bit more. But if he charges
his customers the same price, he is then in the best position to spread that risk
only if the risk is much the same for any of his customers or clients. If the
adverse consequences differ from one customer or client to the next, the
breaching party will be compensated for bearing it only if he charges a higher
price to those customers for whom the adverse consequences are likely to be
abnormally large.
From what has been said, we can understand how the so-called “new
business rule” ought to be applied. The rule excludes damages for the profits lost
when a breach of contract prevented the opening of a new business on the
grounds that the profits could not be proved with sufficient certainty. Some
scholars have said the rule is foolish,138 and others that it has been nearly
abandoned.139
Once again, we are indebted to Victor Goldberg who pointed out that the rule
often serves the same purpose as the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale. For example,

136. Id.
137. Id. at 320.
138. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 234–35; ROBERT L. DUNN, THE
RECOVERY OF DAMAGE FOR LOST PROFITS 392 (6th ed. 2005).
139. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 833 (3rd ed. 1999).
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in Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co.,140 the court denied damages for the
profit that was lost when the late delivery of furniture, priced at $1376.75,
delayed the opening of a retail store. In Marvell Light & Ice Co. v. General
Electric Co.,141 the court denied damages for the profit lost when the delivery of
ice-making machinery was delayed. As Goldberg noted, the problem was not that
proving the amount of lost profits was difficult. It was whether the foreseeability
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale had been satisfied. In Cramer it was not. In Marvell
it may have been. The buyer of the ice-making machinery had notified the seller
when the contract was made of the consequences of delay. Nevertheless, if our
approach to Hadley is correct, what should matter is not foreseeability but
whether the buyer was apt to suffer an abnormally large amount of harm and, if
so, whether he paid the seller to assume that risk. 142
Indeed, Alan Farnsworth has said, citing Fuller and Perdue: “If the test of
foreseeability is met, but the court concludes that liability would impose on the
party in breach a risk disproportionate to the rewards that the party stood to gain
by the contract, ‘the test of certainty is the most usual surrogate.’” 143 If that is so,
one might ask Farnworth, or Fuller and Perdue, what is the significance of the
“expectation interest” if what matters is the risks the parties assumed, which
depends on whether the risk was disproportionately high?
III. ECONOMIC FAIRNESS AND VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE
Contracts of exchange should be not only economically fair but also
voluntary. They are voluntary so long as a party puts a higher value on what he is
to receive than on what he is to give. An adequate remedy neither deprives the
non-breaching party of a compensation for a risk he paid the other party to
assume, nor foists on him a transaction to which he never consented. In this part,
we will see how the law of remedies reflects both these concerns.
A. Unique Performances
When performance is unique, it may have a value to the recipient that cannot
140. 119 N.E. 227 (N.Y. 1918).
141. 259 S.W. 741 (Ark. 1924).
142. Goldberg also pointed to cases in which damages for lost profits should be recovered, not because a
business is new, but because the plaintiff who was unable to open his business in one location could have made
a similar profit by investing the same resources in opening his business elsewhere. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING
DAMAGES, supra note 29, at 231–39. Examples are Fera v. Village Plaza, 242 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1976), Super
Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson, 506 So.2d 317 (Ala. 1987), and cases in which a would be franchisee never
proved he would do better in one location than another. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING DAMAGES, supra note 29, at
237–38. Goldberg also discusses how the new business rule should apply to non-payment of royalties. By our
approach, in these cases, damages in these cases concern the value of the performance contracted for, and so
need not be proven with any greater degree of certainty than any other element of the plaintiff’s case. See id. at
239–45.
143. FARNSWORTH, supra note 139, at 831–32.
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be measured by money damages. The plaintiff is entitled to specific
performance.144
That remedy is usually explained as a means of protecting the “expectation
interest” of the non-breaching party. A damage award may enable him to
purchase a similar performance, but because the one promised him had unique
features that no substitute performance will have, its value to him may be greater
than its market value. Only a decree of specific performance will ensure that he is
put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed.
Again, to say so is to presume that the non-breaching party has an
“expectation interest” and that protecting it is the purpose of giving a remedy. By
our approach, the purpose should be to respect voluntariness and economic
fairness.
When performance is unique, a damages remedy that awards the difference
between the market value of a substitute performance and the contract price
would foist on the non-breaching party a transaction to which he never
consented. He never agreed to pay the contract price for a performance that lacks
some of the features that make the original performance valuable to him.
When a performance is unique, a damage remedy is economically unfair as
well. As noted earlier, if the parties contract for a unique item, such as a house,
the seller gives up the chance that if he had waited longer he could have received
a higher price. The buyer gives up the chance that if he had looked further he
could have paid the same price for as satisfactory a house, or a lower price for a
more satisfactory one. Each of them contracts to avoid the risk that otherwise he
will have to accept a less favorable bargain. Consequently, it is economically
unfair for the seller to back out if he has found a third party who will pay more
for the house. For the same reason, it is unfair if the seller should change his
mind and decide the house is worth more to him than the contract price. From the
standpoint of fairness, it does not matter whether the house is now worth more to
a third party or to a repentant seller. It is economically unfair to deprive the buyer
of his guarantee that he would not have to accept a bargain he regards as less
favorable.
The reason for giving specific performance, then, is not to protect a party’s
“expectation interest,” although that remedy will put the party in as good a
position as he would have been if the contract had been performed. The reason is
because a contract should be both voluntary and economically fair, and a remedy
should therefore be concerned with voluntariness and fairness.
The idea that the purpose of a remedy is to protect the “expectation interest”
may have inspired the theory of efficient breach. Those who explain contract law
in terms of efficiency have described the protection of a party’s “expectation
interest” as a consequence of the “indifference principle.” Under that principle,

144. .See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §359(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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the remedies for breach of contract should “leave the [promisee] absolutely
indifferent, in subjective terms, between having the defendant breach and pay
damages or having the defendant perform.”145 That principle is said to be
efficient for reasons that we described earlier.
Suppose A agrees to sell something to B for a certain price and then
discovers that C will pay much more for it than B ever would, and indeed, more
than the amount B will suffer if the contract is breached. According to Richard
Posner, it is “efficient” for A to breach his contract with B. B is no worse off
because he will receive damages sufficient to put him in as good as a position as
if the contract had been performed. A and C are better off. Therefore, the breach
is efficient. If “[a] party’s profit from breach would exceed . . . the expected
profit to the other party from completion of the contract, and if damages are
limited to the loss of that profit, there will be an incentive to commit a breach.
But there should be.”146
Admittedly, if C knew of the contract between A and B, he could have
contacted B himself and asked B to resell to him. If C did not know of the
contract, A could have contacted B and offered to tell him about C’s interest in
return for a finder’s fee. Either way, C will end up owning the object in question,
which is the efficient result. But a resale by B, according to Posner, “would have
introduced an additional step, with additional transactions costs.” 147 One can raise
questions about the significance of these “transactions costs.” Posner
acknowledged that if the original buyer (B) resells “litigation costs would be
reduced.” But he expects transaction costs to be “high . . . because it would be a
bilateral monopoly negotiation.”148 One difficulty with this argument is that there
would also be a “bilateral monopoly negotiation” if A sells directly to C. There is
no reason to suppose, as Posner does, that A will tamely accept C’s first offer. 149
Nor is it clear that transactions costs will be particularly high given that the
parties have an incentive to minimize them. Admittedly, from the standpoint of
efficiency, all that matters is that C ends up with the object in a question, that A
and B are no worse off, and that transactions costs are minimized. From this
standpoint, if C were willing to pay a vastly greater amount for the object than B
(i.e., a million dollars), and the transactions were $1000 greater if B were to
negotiate directly with C, for that reason alone, A would be entitled to so much
of the million dollars as he could persuade C to pay. This kind of argument, in
which who has the right to an enormously valuable asset turns on how to avoid a
trivial saving in transactions costs, would appeal only to someone who is so
committed to economic explanations of law that he believes nothing, but

145. Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 629, 636 (1988).
146. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 89–90 (2nd ed. 1977).
147. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 151 (8th ed. 2011).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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efficiency could matter.
Suppose, instead, we ask how the parties allocated the risk that the object can
be resold to a third party for more than the contract price. If the object in question
is not unique and is readily available on the market, the issue of efficient breach
does not arise since the third party would buy such an object on the market at the
market price. Suppose that the object is unique, such as a house, a racehorse, or a
Fragonard, and that it would be of interest to a number of buyers. If our previous
analysis is correct, we can see why in these cases the original seller is entitled to
the performance even if a third party is willing to pay a higher price. Typically,
in the sale of a unique performance, the buyer gives up the chance that if he had
looked further he could have paid the same price for as satisfactory a house or a
lower price for a more satisfactory one. Each party contracts to avoid the risk that
otherwise he will have to accept a less favorable bargain. Consequently, it is
economically unfair for the seller to back out if he has found a third party who
will pay more for the house. It does not matter whether the third party appears on
the scene earlier than expected.
To make his claim plausible, Posner described a different type of contract:
one in which the object is unique but in which, at the time of contracting, the
parties believed it would be of interest to only one buyer. The object is custommade by the seller for the buyer. In Posner’s hypothetical case, a seller agreed to
deliver 100,000 “custom-ground widgets” for ten cents apiece for use in the
buyer’s boiler factory. After he has delivered 10,000 to the buyer, a third party
comes to him and “explains that he desperately needs 25,000 custom-ground
widgets at once, since otherwise he will be forced to close his pinola factory at
great cost,” and offers to pay fifteen cents apiece. Seller sells him the widgets,
causing the original buyer to lose $1,000 in profits, but making for himself an
additional profit of $1,250.
Earlier, we discussed contracts for the manufacture of custom-made goods
that are expected to be of use only to the buyer. The risk that the parties normally
assume is whether the cost of performance will be greater or less than the
contract price. In contrast, when the performance is unique but is expected to be
of value to a number of buyers, as in the sale of the oriental rug, the racehorse, or
the Fragonard, the risk the parties normally assume is whether either, if he waits,
will receive an offer that is greater or lesser than the contract price. Posner picked
an example that concerns a risk—the unexpected appearance of a third party who
will pay more than the contract price—that parties to a contract for custom-made
goods normally do not consider if they expect the good to be of use only to a
particular buyer.
Because the parties did not consider that risk, it is hard to see any sound
principled solution. The reason is the same as in a situation in which a contract
for custom-made goods is invalid for impossibility or frustration. The party who
undertook the performance may have incurred costs that he cannot recoup. Some
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scholars have argued that he should be able to recover at least some of these costs
from the other party, 150 and others that he should not.151 The Second Restatement
provides that “if the rules [stated elsewhere] will not avoid injustice, the court
may grant relief on such terms as justice requires including protection of the
parties’ reliance interests.”152 Nevertheless, even the Reporter for the Second
Restatement, Allan Farnsworth, admitted that there is little or no judicial support
for allowing recovery.153
In that situation, the performance unpredictably became of use to no one. The
parties did not allocate the risk that the costs incurred would be a dead loss. In
Posner’s hypothetical, the performance unpredictably became of use to more than
one potential buyer. The parties did not allocate the risk of an unexpected
windfall due to that buyer’s chance appearance. In both situations, the risk the
parties did allocate was a different one: the risk that the cost of the performance
would be greater or lesser than the contract price. It is no wonder that it is hard in
either case to reach a principled result. For that very reason, it is unwise to
establish a general theory on a type of case in which a principled result is so
elusive.
B. Partial or Defective Performances
As we have said, a contract of exchange should be both voluntary and
economically fair. A good remedy should respect both concerns. It will not foist
an unwanted exchange on either party. Neither will it allow either to party to
escape the consequences of a risk that he has been compensated to assume.
When a performance is partial or defective, the non-breaching party should
not be forced to accept it if he would not have agreed to do so had the
opportunity been offered him at the time he contracted. Otherwise he will be
obliged to exchange on terms to which he never would have consented. If,
however, the non-breaching party would have agreed to accept the partial or
defective performance at a reduced price, he should be required to do so. There is
no reason he should be able to refuse and purchase them at a cheaper price from
someone else. To do so would be economically unfair to the other party. When
the parties contracted, each gave up the opportunity to seek a more favorable
bargain with someone else to avoid the risk of finding a worse one.
Such a solution reconciles the principles of voluntariness and fairness only if
we speak of “voluntariness” in a more extended sense. When the parties contract,
the exchange is voluntary in the sense that each party gives up something he
values less to receive something he values more. Here, one must ask whether a

150.
151.
(1984).
152.
153.
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party would have valued receiving the partial or defective performance more than
the reduced price which he will pay for it. That is a choice he never made.
Admittedly, it strains the normal meaning of the word “voluntariness,” and to
decide what he would have done requires guesswork. Nevertheless, such a
solution comes closest to reconciling voluntariness and economic fairness.
Sometimes, once again, a remedy that reflects these concerns will put the
non-breaching party in as good a position as he would have been in had the
performance not been partial or defective. Sometimes it will not. But in any
event, what should matter is voluntariness and fairness, not the protection of a
party’s “expectation interest” as though it were the purpose of giving a remedy.
1. Repudiating the contract.
Sometimes, when a performance is partial of defective, the non-breaching
party claims not to be bound by the terms of the original agreement. The
concerns that matter—voluntariness and economic fairness—are far better
reflected in the doctrine of substantial performance, which governs the provision
of services, than in the doctrine of perfect tender which governs the sale of
goods.
2. Substantial performance.
As we have seen, when the parties contract for the performance of a service
at a fixed price, the parties have, so to speak, made a bet on whether the cost of
performance will be higher or lower than the contract price. The contractor takes
the risk of incurring a loss if it is higher, but he will gain if it is lower. The
doctrine of substantial performance determines when a non-breaching party can
be held to the terms of the bet despite the other party’s breach.
If our approach is correct, when a performance is partial or incomplete, the
party owed performance should have to pay for it at a reduced price if, and only
if, he would have agreed to do so at the time he contracted. If he would, he
should not be allowed to use other party’s failure to perform fully as an excuse to
escape the risk he assumed when he entered into a fixed price contract.
That approach is consistent with standard doctrine as summarized by the
Second Restatement. It lists a series of factors to be taken into account in
determining whether a party has substantially performed. Two of the factors
concern the amount by which the value of the performance to the party who is to
receive has been diminished: “(a) the extent to which the injured party will be
deprived of the value which he reasonably expected to receive; (b) the extent to
which the injured party can be compensated for the part of that benefit of which
he will be deprived.”154 A third is “(c) the extent to which the party failing or

154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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perform . . . will suffer forfeiture.” By our approach, these factors should be
taken into account by asking, would the injured party have agreed to receive a
performance which deprives him of the value which he reasonably expected to
receive if he had been offered sufficient compensation? If so, he should be liable
for the contract price minus the amount of that compensation. He should not be
allowed to repudiate the contract and have the work done more cheaply since
then the other party would forfeit his right to profit if the work could be done
more cheaply.
It may be difficult to tell when the party would have been willing to accept
such a performance at a reduced price. Judge Cardozo, in his classic decision in
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, noted that the defects in performance were “of trivial or
inappreciable importance” and “insignificant in . . . relation to the project.”155
The contractor, making an innocent mistake, had installed Coulter Pipes when
the specifications called for Reading Pipes. The quality and cost of the two
brands of pipe were much the same. In other cases, the defects were so
substantial that the court questioned whether the party owed performance would
have accepted them at any reduction in price: for example, when a contractor
installed a russet-colored shingle roof with yellow streaks that could not be
removed without rebuilding the roof.156 In intermediate cases, there will be
guesswork as to what the party owed performance would be willing to accept.
There is no way to avoid the guesswork, however, and still have a rule that
reflects both of the concerns we have described. The party owed performance
should not be obliged to accept an exchange to which he would not have agreed.
Neither should he be allowed to escape the consequences of the risk that, in a
fixed-price contract, he was compensated to assume.
In two situations, however, this rule needs to be qualified. In one, the
contractor has completed very little of the work. Courts have recognized that his
failure to do so should prevent him from claiming that he has substantially
performed.157 It may be that the other party can receive exactly the performance
for which he contracted by hiring someone else to complete the work. But, by
entering into a fixed price contract, the party who was to perform assumed the
risk of how high the cost of completing the work would be. If he was fired before
he had done much or any work, as we have seen, courts have allowed him to
recover the profits he might have made on little more evidence that the estimates
he used to compile his bet. The reason is that a breach by the party who was to
receive the performance made it impossible to tell what his actual costs would
have been. If the contractor breaches the contract having completed little or no
work, his own breach has made that determination impossible. If he were allowed
to recover the contract price minus the cost of completion incurred by the owner,
he could enter into a contract, breach it immediately, and then recover a lost
155. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E 889, 890, 892 (N.Y. 1921).
156. O.W. Grun Roofing & Constr. Co. v. Cope, 529 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
157. Keyer v. Driscoll, 159 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wisc. 1968).
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profit by claiming that the other party overbid.
In another situation, the contractor acted in bad faith. As the Second
Restatement notes, in determining whether a party has substantially performed,
another factor to consider is “the extent to which the behavior of the party failing
to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.”158 For
example, the contractor should not be able to claim he has substantially
performed if he deliberately substituted different and cheaper materials than
those called for by the contract to lower his cost of performance. That is so even
if the non-breaching party would have been willing to accept a performance
using these cheaper materials and if he had been offered a suitably reduced price.
Under the contract, the contractor assumed the risk of how much it would cost to
complete the project using the materials the contract specified. He should not be
able to cheat and also hold the other party to the terms of their bet. Consider a
game of bridge in which one party cheats by peeking at the other party’s cards. It
should not matter whether the information he obtains is actually of use to him:
for example, whether or not he learns that he can finesse the other party’s king,
or that he can pull the other party’s trump. By peeking he changed the odds that
he would win. The fact that he happens to win anyway does not make the game a
fair one.
3. The perfect tender rule.
As a general rule, as in the case of services, whether the buyer can reject
goods that are defective should depend on whether, at the time of the contract,
the buyer would have been willing to accept the goods despite the defect with a
discount in price. If so, his later refusal to accept them on delivery has nothing to
do with the defect. He may have changed his mind. He may now be able to buy
similar goods more cheaply. But he should not be able to deprive the seller of a
remedy based on the contract price.
Consequently, the “perfect tender rule” of the Uniform Commercial Code is
not the correct solution. It provides that, “[i]f the goods or the tender of delivery
fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may . . . reject the whole
. . . .”159 If the seller was acting in good faith, and the buyer would have been
willing to accept the defective goods with a price discount, there is no reason
why the buyer should be able to refuse the goods and allow them to buy goods at
a cheaper price when the market price has fallen. Yet the Code allows him to do
so.160
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). The remaining factor is
“(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform . . . will cure the failure . . . .” As the Official Comment to
that provision notes, that factor concerns, not the right of the non-breaching party to repudiate the contract, but
his “right to withhold further performance as a means of securing his expectation of an exchange of
performances.” Id.
159. U.C.C. § 2-601 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
160. One limitation on the buyer’s right to refuse the goods is the general requirement that rights under
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One limitation on the perfect tender rule is that the buyer who accepts goods
may reject them afterward only if their “nonconformity substantially impairs its
value to him . . . .”161 A similarly worded limitation applies to installment
contracts. The buyer may reject a single installment only if its nonconformity
substantially impairs its value even the seller cannot cure. He may cancel the
entire contract if the nonconformity of one or more shipments substantially
impairs the value of the whole.162
By our approach, the rule should be that the buyer must accept nonconforming goods at a discount if he would have done so had the offer been
made to him originally. The rule that he can reject the goods only if they
substantially impair their value to him is a step in that direction. The test,
however, should not be “substantial impairment”; he might have been willing to
accept such goods only if he were offered with a discount, and indeed, with at a
greater discount, he might have been willing to accept them even if their value to
him is substantially impaired.
Another limitation on the perfect tender rule is that the seller may have the
right to cure by making a conforming delivery. His right to do so, however, is
restricted in two ways. First, he has the right to cure so long as “the time for
performance has not yet expired.” 163 Second, if the time for performance has
expired, the seller has a “reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender”
provided that he “had reasonable grounds to believe it would be acceptable with
or without money allowance.”164
In either case, the buyer is entitled to a conforming tender even if he would
originally have agreed to accept goods that do not conform albeit at a lower
price. The first restriction allows the seller’s right to cure to depend on how
speedily he can buy conforming goods. If he cannot do so within the time of
performance, the buyer is free to reject the goods, even if he does so because the
market price has fallen since the contract was made, and even if the lack of
conformity does not impair their value to him at all.
The second limitation is strange. It allows the seller’s right to cure to depend
on his expectations of what goods the buyer would have been willing to accept
with a discount. Why should the seller’s reasonable expectations matter? His
good faith should matter. But good faith is not the same as a belief that the goods
would be acceptable to the buyer. The seller may not know of the defect. He may
know of the defect and suspect that they are not acceptable. Bad faith should cost
the Code must be exercised in good faith. U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). But it
does not prevent a buyer from rejecting goods on account of a defect that does not “substantially impair” their
value to him. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). The Code deems him to be
acting in good faith even if he does so to obtain a price that is more favorable to him, and less favorable to the
seller, than the contract price.
161. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
162. U.C.C. §§ 2-612(2)–(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
163. U.C.C. § 2-508(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
164. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
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him his bargain only if he is trying to cheat the buyer. He is not trying to do so as
long as he is honest with the buyer about the condition of the goods.
Consider some variations on the facts of T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated
Edison Co.165 There, the seller was under contract to deliver fuel oil with a sulfur
content of less than 0.5%. He did not realize that the oil he was delivering had a
sulfur content of 0.9 %, but, had he known, he would have reasonably believed
that the buyer would find oil of that sulfur content acceptable. The court ruled
that the seller did not have to believe that his oil was non-conforming to be
allowed to cure. That result is sensible. There is no reason that the seller should
be in a better position if it thinks it is delivering non-conforming goods than if it
thinks it is not. Suppose, however, that the facts were the same but that the seller
did not know that the buyer could use oil with a sulfur content of 0.9%. It would
seem that the result should be the same as long as the buyer should reasonably
have found oil of that sulfur content acceptable. What the seller believed,
reasonably or not, did not affect what the seller did. It delivered oil that it
reasonably believed had a sulfur content of 0.5 %.
Suppose, then, that the seller had no information as to the maximum sulfur
content of the oil that the buyer could use, and that it had learned that the oil it
had already purchased had a sulfur content of 0.9 %. It delivered the oil anyway,
informing the buyer of the discrepancy, in the hope that that the buyer would
accept the shipment. Can the buyer reject the oil anyway? If so, then the seller is
worse off because he made the wrong guess about the buyer’s needs than, as in
the previous hypothetical, in which he made no guess at all. If not, then despite
subsection 2, the seller’s expectations do not matter. What matters is whether he
delivers goods that meet the buyer’s needs.
C. Breach of warranty.
We have already discussed when the buyer should recover consequential
damages for a defective performance. It depends on how the parties have
allocated the risk that they will occur. Leaving that question aside, according to
our approach, the buyer should be allowed to repudiate the contract only if he
would have been unwilling to accept the goods with a price discount had that
alternative been offered him at the time of the contract. If he would have been
willing to do so, he should be required to accept the goods and receive the
amount of the price reduction that would have induced him to accept them.
This was the approach of the ius commune, the version of Roman law that
became accepted throughout most of continental Europe before codification. In
Roman law, if goods were defective, the buyer might have the right to return
them and recover the purchase price. Or he might have the right to recover for the
diminution the value of the goods due to the defects. The remedies had first been

165. 443 N.E.2d 932, 934 (N.Y. 1982).
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provided for the sale of slaves and animals, and later granted to buyers in general.
There was a continuing discussion over when a buyer was entitled to rescission
and when to the diminution of value. The prevailing opinion among early modern
jurists was that the buyer should only be able to seek rescission if he would not
have bought the object had he known of the defect. 166
The same option was given to the buyer by the French Civil Code of 1804167
and the German Civil Code of 1900,168 and recognized intermittently in common
law. In the United States, the Uniform Sales Act of 1906, in provisions copied
almost verbatim from the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, provided that the
buyer might “rescind the contract . . . and recover the price”169 or he might
“accept or keep the goods, and set up against the seller, the breach of warranty by
way of recoupment or diminution or extinction of the price.” 170
In both Acts, side by side with this earlier solution, a modern one appeared
which later became the exclusive solution. The buyer was given an alternative
remedy. He might “maintain an action against the seller for damages for breach
of warranty” 171 in which “the measure of damages” is “the difference between
the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they
would have had if they had answered to the warranty.” 172 Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, the earlier solution disappeared and the alternative remedy
became the exclusive remedy. Section 2-714(2) provides: “The measure of
damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of
acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show
proximate damages of a different amount.”173
If it were true that the goal of remedies for breach of contract is to protect a
party’s “expectation interest,” then this rule would be the correct one. It may be,
however, that if the defects had been known at the time of contracting, the seller
would not have been willing to part with them at a reduced price. He would have
agreed to the exchange only at a higher price than the buyer would be willing to
pay. There would have been no contract. In that event, to require the buyer to pay
the increased price would be to bind him to a bargain to which he never
consented. But to require the seller to pay the higher price, or to provide
conforming goods that he would not have sold except for that higher price, would
be to bind him to a bargain that he never accepted. If the seller would have been
unwilling to provide conforming goods at such a price, it is economically unfair
to require him to do so without any evidence that he assumed such a risk. In such
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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situations, the non-breaching party should not be put in as good a position as he
would have been in if the breach had not occurred.
In one such situation, the goods are worthless unless they are repaired, and
the cost of repairing them exceeds the contract price. In Continental Sand and
Gravel v. K & K Sand and Gravel,174 the defendant sold front-loaders, cranes,
and other equipment for $50,000.175 An express warranty was breached, and the
plaintiff recovered $104,206.75, which was the cost of the repairs necessary to
put the equipment in the condition warranted. The court allowed recovery of that
amount under § 2-714(2) of the Code, rejecting the defendant’s argument that
recovery should be “diminution in value from the purchase price as the result of
the breach of warranty.”176 The “result is logical,” the court said, “since to limit
recoverable damages by the purchase price . . . would clearly deprive the
purchaser of the benefit of its bargain . . . .”177 At the time the parties contracted,
the seller gave up his chance that if he sold later, he would receive more than
$50,000 for the equipment to avoid the risk that he would have to sell it for less.
Had he known of the defect, presumably, he would have been willing to sell the
equipment at a discounted price to avoid the similar risk that later he would have
to sell the defective goods for less. But there is no reason to think that he was
willing to assume the risk of paying twice the contract price to the buyer if the
equipment was defective. There is no reason to think that the buyer would have
been willing to pay that much to acquire it.
In another such situation, the goods will not do the job that they were
warranted to do, and the cost of goods that will do the job exceeds the contract
price. In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.,178 the plaintiff
purchased a computer for $45,000 that was warranted to run an accounting
program that the plaintiff wished to use. The computer was unable to do so. The
value of a computer that would was $207,826.50.179 The court awarded that
amount, which was correct if the true goal of remedies for breach of contract is
protect the non-breaching party’s expectation interest.
To avoid the evident unfairness of the result, as Christopher Wonnel
observed, some have suggested that the expectation is protected if we read in an
implied or gap-filling term that limits their damages to those that they would
have wanted.180 As he noted:
174. 755 F.2d 87, 89 (7th Cir. 1985).
175. I thank Mark Gergen for noting how unlikely it is that $50,000 was a genuine sales price. It was the
price set for the equipment in a larger deal which included the transfer of other assets and may have been
artificially low. The court, however, treated is as a genuine price.
176. Continental Sand, 755 F.2d at 91.
177. Id. at 91–92.
178. 670 F.2d 1304, 1305 (3rd Cir.1982).
179. At least, the court accepted that figure although the dissent pointed out there was little evidence to
support it. Id. at 1307.
180. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & JOHN HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 690
(4th ed. 1985), cited by Christopher Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance and the Two Contractual Wrongs, 8 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 53, 75 n.63 (2001).
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The problem with this argument is that any remedial scheme can be made
consistent with expectation theory in this way, by saying that parties would have
wanted it. The interesting question is what kind of substantive and remedial
scheme the parties to a contract would want . . . .181
So, we come back to the question which, by our approach, should be asked:
what risks did the parties assume when they contracted? In Chatlos, there is no
reason to believe that the seller would have been willing to assume the risk that
he would have to pay that amount to the buyer had the parties known about the
defect at the time the contract was made. There is no reason to believe that the
buyer would have been willing to pay that much to have a computer that would
run his accounting program.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have realized that we cannot live with what Eisenberg has called
“classical law” of contract. Its formalism and conceptualism have been under
attack since the early 20th century. We have not fully realized how many of our
assumptions about contract law are holdovers from the contract law we are trying
to escape.
One example is the 19th century principle that contract is the expressed will
of the parties. We have recognized that this principle does not explain why
sometimes, the parties are bound to terms that they never contemplated, and
sometimes, they are not bound to terms which they agreed. Hao Jiang and I
argued that the problems remain because we look for answers by manipulating
the idea of what constitutes the will of the parties: it must be autonomous,
informed, given without unfair pressure, and so forth. We should ask a question
that the 19th century jurists did not: when are the terms of a contract fair? We
suggested that for the terms of a contract to be fair, they must be voluntary in the
sense that each party prefers what he is to receive to what he is to give in return.
It must also be economically fair in the sense that each party is compensated for
the risks he assumes.
Another example we have seen is the principle that a party’s expectation
interest should be protected. I have argued that the problems it leads to arise
because the principle itself is a legacy of the 19th century which we should do
without. We should not try to find a modern justification for it. We should
consider instead when a remedy is fair. That should depend on two principles:
that each party be held responsible for the risks that he has been compensated to
assume, and that a party should not be held to an agreement to which he never
consented.

181. Wonnell, supra note 180.
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